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The Euro crisis 2009–2012 made sovereign debt a significant problem in many European countries, 
which was a significant change to the prevailed thought that the sovereign debt of developed country is a 
safe asset. The increase in sovereign default risk was recognized to be in close connection with the 
banking sector credit risk. This thesis explains the relationship of sovereign and bank credit risk, a 
phenomenon called “the feedback loop”. 
 
The feedback loop occurs between the sovereign and banks when the deterioration of sovereign 
creditworthiness reduces the market value of banks’ holdings of sovereign debt. The value reduction 
decreases the solvency of banks and in the worst case leads to insolvency, which requires the sovereign 
to bail out the banks. This in turn induces negative feedback to the sovereign increasing risk and 
reducing the market value of the sovereign debt even further, creating a self-perpetuating loop.  
 
The formal mathematical model of the feedback loop is presented in this thesis. First a one-country 
model, which is then extended to a two-country model. Using these models, the channels linking the 
sovereign and banks together, as well as the factors affecting the occurrence of the feedback loop can 
be examined in detail.  
 
Further, I create a model of a banking union, based on the two-country model. The proposed model 
shows how the banking union can prevent the feedback loop. The banking union model is also used to 
study issues affecting the design of the banking union, like the limits of its costs and resources. 
 
The analysis reveals, that when banks' equity and a sovereign fiscal surplus are low, and banks are 
exposed to sovereign debt, a drop in a value of sovereign debt leads to a feedback loop. The two-
country model shows that the feedback loop can also be the result of a price drop of foreign debt and 
that risk contagion can occur between countries. Banks may also be exposed to part of the sovereign 
debt risk without direct holdings, through their holdings of the foreign sovereign debt. In addition, the role 
of banking union, which is responsible for bailing out banks instead of the sovereign, is studied with the 
two-country model. The feedback loop can be prevented by requiring banks to hold sufficient amounts of 
equity relative to their sovereign exposures. Furthermore, the banking union removes the link between 
banks and the sovereign, preventing the feedback loop from starting. However, the banking unions 
success is dependent of the design of the union, and may in cases of too small resources lead to worse 
situation in member states than without the union. 
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1 Introduction
This thesis aims to create deeper understanding about the vitally important interplay
between a sovereign debt and a bank credit risk. Before financial crisis in 2007–2008, the
sovereign debt of developed countries was widely considered a safe asset for investors.
The financial crisis and especially Euro crisis that followed in 2009-2012 changed this
understanding, by making the sovereign debt a significant problem in many European
countries. This development can be illustrated with figure 1, that shows the long-term
government bond yields in some Euro countries. From 2008 onwards, the graph reveals
significant divergence between the so called Eurozone core and periphery countries. This
divergence reflects significant change in the investors’ perception of the risk related to
these countries.
Figure 1: 10 year government bond yields in some Eurozone countries 2007–2015, data
from Fred1, graph follows the one in Battistini et al. (2014).
1Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, FRED Economic Data, http://fred.stlouisfed.org
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One of the countries that suffered a large increase in bond yields, and related debt risk,
was Ireland. Figure 2 shows the development of Irish sovereign CDS (credit default swap)
and Irish bank CDS prices. The CDS is used to hedge a credit default and its price is
then an indicator of the risk level of the underlying debt. The graph shows that at the date
when Irish government announced to guarantee the liabilities of Irish banks, bailed out
the banks, the risk of banks drops, but the sovereign risk jumps immediately. After the
bailout event two risks are developing very similarly. This example of Ireland indicates a
close connection between sovereign and bank credit risks as a reason for Euro crisis.
Figure 2: The sovereignCDS (credit default swap) and bankCDS for Ireland in 2007–2010,
graph from Acharya et al. (2014). 2
This thesis explains the relationship of sovereign and bank credit risk. This relationship
is called a feedback loop, or a diabolic loop, or a doom loop. The feedback loop occurs
when the deterioration of sovereign creditworthiness reduces themarket value of sovereign
bonds that banks hold as assets, which may lead to bank insolvency and require sovereign
bailout. This induces negative feedback to the sovereign increasing risk and reducing
2Acharya et al. (2014): “The bank CDS is computed as the equally-weighted average of bank CDS for
banks headquartered in Ireland (Allied Irish Bank, Anglo Irish Bank, Bank of Ireland, and Irish Life
and Permanent). The data are from Datastream.”
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bond prices even further, creating a self-perpetuating loop. Home bias, banks holding
excess amount of domestic sovereign debt, existence of a bailout option and free capital
movements are ingredients enabling the feedback loop.
The formal mathematical model of the feedback loop is presented, first as a one-country
model that follows the work of Brunnermeier et al. (2016), which is then extended to a
two-country version. The models reveal that when banks’ equity and a sovereign fiscal
surplus are low, and banks hold substantial amount of sovereign debt, a drop in a value
of sovereign debt leads to a feedback loop equilibrium. The two-country model reveals
that also foreign sovereign debt is a risky asset to banks, and feedback loop contagion
can occur between countries. The two-country model also shows that risk related to the
investment portfolio of a bank depends on the portfolios of banks in the other country, and
reveals the complexity of cross dependencies between countries and their banking sectors.
Finally, a model of banking union is presented. The idea in the banking union is that it
performs the bank bailouts, and thus it can break the link from banks to sovereign and
prevent the feedback loop. I order to succeed in this task the banking union has to possess
enough resources.
The structure of the thesis is following. Chapter 2 presents the background theory of
the feedback loop and the banking union. Chapter 3 contains a literature review of the
feedback loop models. The one-country model is presented in Chapter 4 and two-country
extension in 5 while Chapter 6 presents the banking union model. Chapter 7 contains
analysis based on the models and Chapter 8 concludes the thesis.
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2 Theory of "feedback loop"
This chapter provides a review of the feedback loop theories and background in the
academic literature. The basis of the feedback loop lies in some well-known facts like the
fragility of sovereign debt and banking, and some preconditions, like the home bias and the
theory of efficient bailouts. These fundamentals are presented first and the feedback loop
theory itself after them in this chapter. Finally, some empirical research and background
information is presented about how the relationship between sovereign and bank credit
risk was involved in Euro crisis.
2.1 Fragility of sovereign debt and banking
The feedback loop between the sovereign and bank credit risk is formed between the
sovereign credit risk and private banks balance sheets, both of which have the fundamental
elements of fragility on their own as well (Cooper and Nikolov, 2013). The fragility of
sovereign debt is famously presented by Calvo (1988) and it arises due to a strategic
complementarity between the buyers of government bonds and the government default
decision, which can lead to self-fulfilling prophecy. This means that if lender has concerns
about the government’s ability to repay the sovereign debt, it requires a higher interest
rate, while the higher interest rate weakens the government’s solvency and validates the
pessimistic expectations.
The probability of government defaulting its debt is often seen as a problem for external
debt while domestic sovereign debt is considered safe. The idea is that sovereigns cannot
become over-indebted domestically in their own currency, because they can always inflate
the debt away. Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) show that historically the domestic defaults
cannot be called rare events, even though they are less common than external defaults.
The reason why domestic debt may be defaulted is the costs and distortions that inflation
creates.
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Pozzolo et al. (2016) argue that default of Argentina in 2002 or the partial default of
Greece in 2011 serve as examples that verify the true default risk included in domestic
sovereign debt, even though the probability of default is low. Also, studies like Acharya
et al. (2014) or Battistini et al. (2014) show that during Euro crisis investors started to
take the sovereign default risk more seriously. In the feedback loop context, the default
risk contained in the domestic debt is important aspect, since the loop occurs between the
sovereign and its domestic creditors, specifically banks.
The most famous presentation of banking instability is probably Diamond and Dybvig
(1983), where the authors present the so called bank run. Like the fragility of government
debt in Calvo (1988), the bank run is also based on the idea of a self-fulfilling prophesy.
Now the depositors fear that the bankmay fail and thus they rush towithdraw their deposits.
Because of the sudden withdrawals, the bank may be forced to liquidate many of its assets
at a loss, which eventually is the reason for the banks insolvency and failure. To avoid
bank runs government can provide guarantees to the deposit, which effectively prevents
bank runs from happening due to the idea that the government is always able to gather
as much resources as needed to finance the losses to depositors (Diamond and Dybvig,
1983). However, government guarantees link the sovereign and private banks together in
a way where the bank risk may transfer to the sovereign risk, thus creating one side of the
feedback loop.
2.2 Home bias
Investment portfolio allocation, where an investor overwhelmingly prefers to hold domestic
equity assets is referred to as "home bias". This type of allocation is biased because
investors hold oversized shares of domestic assets despite the potential gains and risk level
reduction from international diversification. (Tesar and Werner 1995.)
Private investors have various reasons for home bias, including irrational individual ten-
dencies (Tesar and Werner, 1995). Banks however, differ from private investors, since
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they are reliant on national policies and international financial regulations. Especially
important is the home bias related to the banks holdings of domestic government bonds.
It is obvious that the larger the share of domestic sovereign debt in the banks’ portfolio,
the more exposed it is to the country specific risk of sovereign debt (Acharya et al., 2014).
The home bias in investments in government bonds is one of the key preconditions for the
occurrence of the feedback loop.
Many studies have shown the statistics of severe home bias during Euro crisis. According
to Acharya et al. (2014), at 2010 in Eurozone almost 70 % of bonds held by banks were
issued by the country in which a bank was headquartered. Similar results can be seen
from the European bank stress test data in 2011, presented by Uhlig (2014), where the
large group of countries exceed the 50 % home share of the sovereign exposure. Battistini
et al. (2014) notice that increase in home bias during crisis is at least partially due to banks
replacing their foreign debt holdings with domestic ones.
There are several reasons why banks allocate their investments heavily on domestic
sovereign debt, especially during crisis. The first explanation is set of policies that Chari
et al. (2014) call as "financial repression". This means that government engages policies
that force banks to hold government debt, when the government faces exceptionally high
fiscal needs, e.g. during financial crises or wartime, or when foreign lending suddenly
stops. While financial repression contains legal methods to oblige banks to buying govern-
ment debt, a little less compelling type of government behavior is called “moral suasion”,
e.g. by Battistini et al. (2014) or Pozzolo et al. (2016). Moral suasion means that the gov-
ernment pressures banks to buying more bonds, especially if banks have previously been
saved by the government using taxpayers’ money. Uhlig (2014) complements financial
repression or moral suasion theories with a political economy explanation, where banks’
holdings of domestic sovereign debt serve as a commitment tool for the government, since
defaulting domestically held debt is politically more difficult as it hurts domestic banks
and savers.
Acharya and Steffen (2015) suggest an alternative explanation to home bias called the
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carry-trade effect. The banks invest in risky and thus high-yield sovereign debt during
crisis and try to exploit the larger price swings of these sovereign bonds. In Eurozone,
in the most extreme case, the banks may even borrow the money that they invest in
domestic bonds from the European Central Bank. However, as Pozzolo et al. (2016)
point out the carry-trade motive only justifies bias towards high risk government bonds,
not exactly home bias. Nevertheless, the carry-trade explanation can be complemented
with an argument that banks cannot hedge the domestic sovereign debt risk, because if
sovereign really does default, the banks run out of business regardless of their sovereign
debt portfolio allocations. Thus, the banks have “nothing to lose” and a rational choice is
trying to benefit from the carry-trade (Pozzolo et al., 2016).
During the Euro crisis banks faced a real threat that Euro will collapse. If this would have
happened the liabilities of banks, as the holdings of domestic sovereign debt, would have
been redenominated into new national currencies. This means that domestic banks had
“comparative advantage” against the redenomination risk compared with foreign banks,
which may have been Eurozone specific explanation of the home bias during the crisis
(Battistini et al., 2014).
Finally, regardless of the crisis, the financial regulation may make domestic sovereign
debt appealing to domestic banks. In International Basel II accord the risk weight of the
sovereign depends on the credit assessment classification, but the accord also includes
a possibility to have national discretion about the risk weight between domestic banks
and the sovereign (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006). The lower the risk
weight of an asset the less requirements for capital is set to banks holding these assets.
There are significant differences in the application of the Basel rules across jurisdictions,
in the European Union authorities have set a zero risk weight to sovereign exposures
denominated and funded in the currency of the correspondingmember state (BISMonetary
and EconomicDepartment, 2013). Also the European Systemic Risk Board (2015) notifies
in their report that the prudential regulations treat the sovereign exposures favorably, e.g.
by setting low capital requirements, categorizing some government bonds as highly liquid
assets, or not limiting the large exposures. Thus, the favorable regulation, may increase
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the home bias even when there is no crisis.
2.3 Bank bailouts
A bailout channel is essential mechanism in feedback loop connecting banks’ credit risk
to sovereign. In practice bailout means that government recapitalizes insolvent banks, or
offers to insure their liabilities. The bailout has provoked lots of public and academic
discussion in questions like, whether sovereign should bailout banks at all, under which
circumstances the bailout is beneficial, or what kind of bailout policy leads to the best
outcome.
Typically, the government bails out banks to protect depositors, borrowers or bankers,
and rationalities why all these groups merit protection have been presented (Diamond
and Rajan, 2002). One common argument is that bailout is necessary to avoid a com-
plete meltdown of the financial sector, which could lead to substantial effects on real
economy (Bianchi, 2016). Classic example is Diamond-Dybvig bank run model, where
the government deposit guarantees effectively prevent bank runs (Diamond and Dybvig,
1983).
Bailout can improve the efficiency of resource allocation from a social point of view, or
have stabilizing effects on the economy. This is because, if all riskwould be concentrated in
the private sector, it would be more cautious and offers less financial services. This under
provision of resources leads to welfare losses. Also, in time of crisis, private investors
would be less eager to run at the first sign of trouble, when bailout is an option. (Keister
2016.) Another resent argument in favor of the bailouts, presented e.g. in Diamond and
Rajan (2002) and Gorton and Huang (2004), is the liquidity effect. This means that banks
insolvency reduces aggregate liquidity in the economy, which may escalate the problems
further, and by bailing out the insolvent bank, government can add liquidity to the economy
and prevent the problems arising from the liquidity shortage.
Contrary to arguments that support bailouts, there are also severe problems related to
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them. First, bailouts are expensive to taxpayers, and deteriorate the creditworthiness of
the government. Second, the risk of the moral hazard is the most discussed disadvantage
of bailouts. Banks have incentive to take excessive risks when they can rely on the
government bailout if the risk realizes. (Bianchi 2016.) Also Diamond and Rajan (2002)
argument that when bailout is not correctly targeted, it can lead to systemic crisis in the
financial system. This is due to increase in excess demand for liquidity that leads to further
insolvencies and bailouts.
The bailout cost and benefit analysis often concentrates on the different bailout policies or
strategies instead of argumentation between bailout and no-bailout policies. E.g. Bianchi
(2016) suggests that bailout has important stabilizing effects despite the moral hazard
risks, when it is broad-based and not targeted to a single bank. Aghion et al. (1999) argue
that bailouts should be strictly conditional, such that banks are obliged to liquidate the
non-performing loans first to get the bailout. They also compare so called soft and hard
bailout policies, where soft means less conditions for banks.
The effects of bailouts are usually analyzed with models containing several agents, most
importantly depositors, banks, entrepreneurs and regulator, e.g. Aghion et al. (1999),
Diamond and Rajan (2002) and Gorton and Huang (2004). The structure is usually such
that entrepreneurs loan money from banks for projects, and the projects may fail causing
entrepreneurs to default their debt. Banks need bailout when the average payoff from
loans does not exceed the value of deposits issued to fund these loans. Sovereigns bailout
decision, or the decision of bailout policy, is typically based on either maximizing expected
social welfare, or minimizing the cost of excessive recapitalization, or to affect the banks
management to evaluate their returns after the bailout.
In conclusion, one can state that some form of bailout policy is a plausible option for
sovereigns now and in the future, and it transfers insolvency risk of banks to sovereign
which is essential in formation of the feedback loop. Also, the academic research about
bailouts can provide insight how the bailouts can be approached in the feedback loop
studies.
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2.4 Feedback loop
The feedback loop is often called “diabolic loop” in economic papers since it is a worsening
self-perpetuating spiral. It connects the sovereign debt risk together with private banks’
solvency. The basic theory about the feedback loop is quite simple. The loop can start from
the unanticipated increase in sovereign debt risk or from solvency issues of a private bank.
In the first case the deterioration of sovereign creditworthiness increases risk involved in
the sovereign debt and thus increases the interest rates of government bonds. This in turn,
reduces the market value of the government bonds that private banks hold as assets, and
may lead to asset-liability mismatch in banks’ balance sheet. In the worst case, bailout
is required to save the bank. The other option is a so called credit crunch, meaning that
the bank needs to reduce its lending. Both induce negative feedback to the sovereign, the
bailout is of course a direct cost to sovereign, as the credit crunch decreases economic
activity i.e. by decreasing investment, and leads to slower economic growth and losses in
tax revenues. Based on these two effects Brunnermeier et al. (2016) divide the feedback
loop in two parts, first is called “a bailout loop” and the second as “a real economy loop”.
The illustration of these feedback loop mechanisms is presented in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Two types of feedback loops, figure from Brunnermeier et al. (2016).
The second case is that feedback loop starts from the banking sector. The bankmay become
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insolvent in example due to actualized credit risk, or because of a bank run. The insolvent
bank needs to be bailed out. The bailout cost deteriorates sovereign credit worthiness
inducing negative feedback to the banks’ balance sheets and creating the pernicious loop.
(Acharya et al. 2014.)
The feedback loop requires some basic ingredients, the most important of which are
covered in more detail in previous chapters. First, home bias makes banks more exposed
to sovereign debt risk than they would be with a more diversified portfolio (Battistini et al.,
2014). Second, the bailout is an optimal choice for government in many situations and
thus governments cannot effectively commit to no-bailout policies. Thirdly, free capital
mobility, which enables international investors to allocate their investments to foreign
government bonds whenever they think that the risk of domestic debt is increasing. Thus,
investors’ perception of the future sovereign solvency has direct effect on the price of the
domestic debt. (Brunnermeier et al. 2016.)
Theory of the feedback loop became topical because of the Euro crisis, which was very
persistent. One of the consequences of the crisis was that sovereign yields of the Eurozone
countries started to diverge. This was illustrated in Figure 1 by showing the long-term
government bond yields. Before 2008 the yields were almost the same in all Euro
countries. After 2008 in the so called core countries of Eurozone, that Germany, France
and Finland represent in figure 1, the yields remain on low levels and even start to decline,
while in the so called peripheral countries, Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Italy, the
yields increase and in the most severely affected countries, Greece, Portugal and Ireland,
the yields rocket up very sharply. The divergence in yields is of course a result of the
perceived risk involved in peripheral economies, and eventually is the core reason why
economic research started pay attention to the possibility of the feedback loop. (Battistini
et al. 2014.)
The origin of Eurozone crisis varies between countries. In Ireland, the starting point of the
feedback loop was in the banking sector, where the financial crisis 2008 caused insolvency
issues, which led to government bailout, and resulted in the increase in government
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default risk as illustrated in Figure 2. The reverse example is Greece, where public over-
indebtedness became issue for private banks. In general, empirical studies, like Acharya
et al. (2014), Battistini et al. (2014) and Bocola (2016), of the feedback loop concentrate
solely on Euro crisis, and find strong empirical support for the feedback loop theory. As
Farhi and Tirole (2016) state, there is exceptionally wide academic consensus about the
feedback loop theory.
2.5 Banking union
The Euro crisis ignited a new development in European integration process, the creation of
a banking union. The European banking union consists of three pillars: Single Supervisory
Mechanism (SSM), Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and a single deposit insurance
scheme (Béranger and Scialom, 2015). One of the initial reasons for the banking union
was to prevent the feedback loop between banks and sovereigns (Constâncio, 2015).
There are several mechanisms in the European banking union aiming to cut the pernicious
feedback loop. The SSM harmonizes banking supervision and rules across countries.
Considering the feedback loop, the harmonization of the risk weights of banks’ assets
is essential. Also, the SSM simplifies and improves the supervision of large banks that
operate in several countries. (Constâncio (2015).)
The key element in prevention of the feedback loop is the SRM.When the banking union is
in action, the SRM is responsible for the resolution of distressed banks, including bailout
decisions. The SRM contains a single resolution fund (SRF), which is funded by banks in
the banking union and which is then used to cover the bailout costs (European Comission,
2015a). Before the SRF funds can be used to bailout banks, the Banking union rules
require the use of so called bail-in, which means that banks shareholders and creditors
must first cover banks liabilities at certain level. The bail-in is not only important to cover
the banks losses without public funding, but it should also reduce excessive risk taking
and moral hazard in banking business. (Constâncio (2015).)
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The bail-in and the use of the SRF is limited to 8% and 5% of the total liabilities of a given
bank respectively. Now, if this is still not enough to save the bank, the sovereign bailout
can be considered. Based on the experiences from the Euro crisis, these thresholds should
clearly be enough to prevent any government involvement. So, when the banking union
is finished the situation leading to the feedback loop should be extremely rare, even if not
entirely impossible. (Constâncio (2015).) However, the creation of the European banking
union is a phased process, and especially the SRF funds are collected during a period
of eight years (European Comission, 2015b). Like Béranger and Scialom (2015) argue,
during the period when the banking union is under construction, the feedback loop is still
possible, since the SRM may face situation in which it simply lacks enough resources
to prevent the bank failure without the government involvement. Béranger and Scialom
(2015), also pose a question about the final size of the resolution fund, which may run out
in severe crisis, when many banks run into problems. In general it can be stated about
the banking union, that the question of the feedback loop is not completely solved, but
it transforms to a question about the credibility and the adequacy of the resources of the
banking union.
13
3 Models of feedback loop in literature
This chapter presents a literature review of the theoretical feedback loop models. Since
the beginning of Euro crisis, several papers have been published presenting models of the
loop. Also, some empirical evidences supporting the theories have been studied. First,
some general features and assumptions related to all the models are presented, and then
closer look at the models and their results is reviewed.
3.1 General features of feedback loop models
Feedback loop models have been presented by several authors including Brunnermeier
et al. (2016), Farhi and Tirole (2016), Cooper and Nikolov (2013) and Leonello (2014),
while Acharya et al. (2014) and Bocola (2016) present a model and test it empirically.
The models of the feedback loop are rather complicated, since they all are multiple period
models with multiple agents. A typical number of periods is 3, while Brunnermeier et al.
(2016) use 4 periods, but these multi-period models are usually simplified, such that only a
limited number of events occur each period, i.e. that consumption or investment decisions
take place only on specific period. Bocola (2016) uses a slightly different approach, since
he uses a neoclassical growth model enriched with a financial sector, hence the model
does not have the same type of periodical structure than the other models. One common
feature to all models is that they contain multiple agents. A sovereign or a government and
banks are obvious agents in this context, but also these models often include consumers,
other investors than the banks, and producers of consumption goods.
A general structure of the feedback loop models is following. On the first period govern-
ment issues a bond with a certain face value and a price, and banks and other investors
buy the bond with different shares. The government default risk follows an exogenous
probability parameter (e.g. Brunnermeier et al. (2016)), or a state of the world drawn
from an exogenous probability distribution (e.g. Farhi and Tirole (2016)). Based on
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the possible changes in the risk, the banks may face equity problems and require bailout
during following periods, and this in turn affects the financial situation of the government
in the last period of the model. The details differ substantially between papers, but this
simplified structure describes the idea of the feedback loop modeling at a very general
level.
Because themodels are quite complicated, the authorsmake some simplifying assumptions
to make the analysis more straightforward. Typical assumption present in some form in
every paper presented here, is that there is no strategic behavior in sovereign default
decision, meaning that default occurs only when sovereign cannot pay its debt. This
seems plausible assumption, especially if Eurozone countries are considered. Other
assumption present in many of the papers is that bailout is always beneficial to sovereign
(e.g. Brunnermeier et al. (2016), Farhi and Tirole (2016)), or similar assumption that
bailout does not occur only when sovereign does not have resources for it (e.g. Cooper
and Nikolov (2013)). As presented in Chapter 2.3, in many cases the bailout is an optimal
choice and thus this assumption is reasonable. It is worth mentioning that some authors do
not do specifically modeling about the bailout channel, but handle government transfers
to financial sector at a more general level.
3.2 Diabolic loop model
Brunnermeier et al. (2016) call feedback loop with descriptive name “diabolic loop”, and
their model is referred here as diabolic loop model. They present a quite straightforward
four period model, with four agents: government, depositors, banks’ equity holders and
investors. They start by defining a one-country model and then extend it to a two-country
model, where both countries are similar with each other. The key difference between these
models is that in one-country model, investors and banks can only hold domestic bonds,
while in two-country model foreign investment is also possible. Because the countries
are symmetric, also foreign bonds contain risk and may be a source for banks’ insolvency,
which differences in example from the model by Farhi and Tirole (2016), since they define
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foreign bonds as safe assets.
The basic idea in a diabolic loop model is, that exogenous probability parameter, the
so called sunspot probability, defines whether the investors become pessimistic and thus
reprice the domestic bond. Repricing may result in a bank becoming insolvent, and if
that happens, the sovereign needs to decide if it bails out the bank. The sovereign can
have either high or low surplus, again according to exogenously given probability, and
only if the surplus is low the sovereign defaults its debt. If sunspot does not happen and
no repricing occurs, sovereign never defaults. When defined like that, the model has two
equilibria, the good one where no bailouts and no defaults ever happen, and the bad one,
diabolic loop equilibrium where bailout happens and in the worst case leads to sovereign
default. (Brunnermeier et al. 2016.)
The main event flow of the diabolic loop model is following. At period 0 government
issues a bond, which investors and banks buy. Sunspot happens at period 1 and investors
reprise the bond. At period 2 government decides whether to bail out banks. At the final
period 3, government surplus is revealed and all consumption takes place. It is important
to notice that government needs to decide about bailout before it knows the tax revenue, in
other words government does not know if it can afford to bail out. If government does not
bailout, the bank reduces lending and this in turn reduces tax revenue for the government,
both reductions are presented as constant parameters. Brunnermeier et al. (2016) make
several assumptions behind the diabolic loop model. The most important assumption that
simplifies the model and its solution is, that the sovereigns fiscal surplus is always positive
before bailout cost. The precondition of home bias in banks assets is assumed, making
the one-country model applicable for analysis. Also, several parametric assumptions are
done to focus the analysis primarily on the occurrence of the feedback loop. The diabolic
loop model is more exactly presented in Chapter 4.
Using the diabolic loop model Brunnermeier et al. (2016) solve a threshold ratio of bank
equity to sovereign exposure. When this threshold is exceeded, the feedback loop occurs.
They also express the same result in a different way by presenting the maximum amount of
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sovereign debt that banks can hold safely, or as a minimum level of banks equity relative
to sovereign debt it owns. The main purpose behind the analysis of Brunnermeier et
al. is to study and present a solution to prevent the feedback loop from happening in
Eurozone. Their suggestion is called European safe bonds, or ESBies, which is a joint
bond of Eurozone countries that is split into a senior and a junior tranche. ESBies are
rather complicated structural financial instruments, but the idea can be simplified such
that the junior tranche contains risk, for investors willing to take more risk, and the senior
trance is a safe asset. Thus, banks can be required to hold only the senior tranche of the
ESBies. Using the diabolic loop model presented above, Brunnermeier et al. show that
this tranche mechanism prevents the feedback loop, and they even come into conclusion
that in equilibrium of the model also the junior tranche is a safe asset.
The diabolic loop model of Brunnermeier et al. (2016) is relatively straightforward and
the paper aims to demonstrate the effectiveness of ESBies as a solution to Eurozone crisis.
Nevertheless, the model is very intuitive in explaining the feedback loop itself and the
conditions required to make it occur.
3.3 Macroprudential regulation
As in the previous chapter, also Farhi and Tirole (2016) use a representative name of
the feedback loop by calling it “doom loop”. In their paper, they present a very elegant
model of the feedback loop. The model has 3 periods and 4 types of agents: international
investors, domestic bankers, domestic consumers and the sovereign. All the agents have
utility functions which are linear over consumption. As usual, agents maximize their
utility, and the sovereign optimizes welfare, which is defined as an expectation of the
sum of agents’ individual utilities. Unlike Brunnermeier et al. (2016) who uses single
probability to represent sunspot that affects investors, Farhi and Tirole uses a state of the
world which follows an exogenous probability distribution, and this state determines the
bankers’ balance sheets and the fiscal capacity of the sovereign. In mathematical sense,
the maximization of expected utility in the model by Farhi and Tirole (2016) is done by
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integrating over the state of the world distribution. This makes the solution of the model
bit more complicated looking than in Brunnermeier et al. (2016).
The simple presentation of the event flow of this model is pretty much like in Brunnermeier
et al. (2016), except only three periods. On period 0 banks choose their portfolios by
investing in domestic and foreign bonds. A state of the world is realized at period 1 and if
a bank becomes insolvent and the sovereign decides to bail out, the sovereign issues new
bond to cover the bailout costs. At period 3 the sovereign defaults, if it cannot afford to
pay its debt with the current tax income. Again, like in Brunnermeier et al., the sovereign
needs to decide whether to bailout before it knows its fiscal capacity. (Farhi and Tirole
2016.)
If the sovereign does not bail out, the banks reduce their lendingwhich reduces investments.
Now in the model investments are part of the welfare function, which the sovereign
maximizes. On the other hand, the bailout cost is relative to the investment, such that
the sovereign bailout is the portion of the investment that the bank cannot afford to. Now
Farhi and Tirole assume that the return of investment is always greater than the cost of
bailout, i.e. the bailout is always an optimal choice. (Farhi and Tirole 2016.)
One important difference between Brunnermeier et al. (2016) and Farhi and Tirole (2016)
is that latter assumes foreign bonds as safe assets. Based on this assumption, Farhi
and Tirole present a supervisory mechanism in the model. This means that exogenous
supervisor can enforce banks to hold a certain level of safe assets, foreign bonds, and the
role of the supervisory mechanism in the occurrence of feedback loops is one of the main
subjects of the paper.
In the equilibrium of the model Farhi and Tirole (2016) solves the direct effect, that change
in the state of the world has on the price of a sovereign bond. This solution shows that, if the
probability of sovereign default increases, the price of a sovereign bond deceases, and the
lower the value of a bond that a bank holds, the bigger the bailout it needs. Remembering
that in this model, the sovereign funded bailout by issuing a new bond, the issuance of a
new bond increases the supply of bonds and thus reduces the price of a bond even further.
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So, this model precisely captures the mechanism of the feedback loop.
Regarding the role of the banking supervision, results are interesting. In the model’s
equilibrium, the consumption maximizing bankers always choose a portfolio where the
amount of safe assets, foreign bonds, is on the lower bound enforced by the supervisor. This
means that the bankers are rent seeking and trying to obtain the largest possible bailout.
(Farhi and Tirole 2016.) Thus, this model also manages to capture the well-established
moral hazard risk related to bank bailouts.
3.4 Role of bank runs
Cooper and Nikolov (2013) approach feedback loop modeling by combining two classical
models: the Diamong-Dybvig bank run model (Diamond and Dybvig 1983) and Calvos
pricing of government debt model (Calvo 1988). The basic structure of the model,
including periods, agents and utility maximization is identical to above-presented Farhi
and Tirole (2016) model. One of the interesting features of Coopers and Nikolovs model
is that they analyze the feedback loop as a Nash equilibrium, where the players are the
households, the banks and the government. Cooper and Nikolov show that the equilibrium
is either the one where the government commits to no bailout policy and banks protect
the deposits by issuing enough equity or the one where the government bails out. For
the reasons discussed earlier in this paper, also Cooper and Nikolov state that the former,
“good” equilibrium with no-bailout policy is not credible. Thus, the latter equilibrium
prevails and the government bails out banks. The bailout means transfer from taxpayers to
depositors, whichmakes depositors better off. As a result, rationally optimizing banks have
little incentive to issue equity and they remain exposed to sovereign debt risk. Eventually,
as a conclusion, the only reason for the feedback loop in this model is the moral hazard
(Cooper and Nikolov 2013.)
Another slightly different model of the feedback loop is presented by Leonello (2014).
The most notable peculiarity in her model is that the probability of crisis in both the
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banking sector and the sovereign is endogenous in the model, while all the other models
have some form of exogenesis in the changes of the risk. The probability of both banking
and sovereign debt crises is made endogenous using global games. Leonello also includes
economic growth in the model and attaches the sovereign debt risk to the level of economic
growth, meaning that the higher the growth the better the future solvency of the sovereign
and the lower the risk of default. Similarly, with Cooper and Nikolov (2013) the bank
runs are an essential feature in this model as well. Using this model Leonello shows
that government guarantees are an essential channel that transfers bank credit risk to the
sovereign. Whether the guarantees lead to a stable equilibrium or to an unstable feedback
loop depends on the size and the scheme of guarantees. (Leonello 2014.) Leonellos model
is somewhat limited compared with the others presented in here, since it does not include
banks’ holdings of government bonds, neither does it contain the real economy part of the
loop, i.e. the lending reduction and its effect on tax revenue.
3.5 Models with empirics
A credit default swap (CDS) is a financial swap agreement that can be used to hedge the
risk of a credit default. The seller of the CDS will compensate the buyer in the event
of a credit default or other credit event. The price of the CDS increases if the risk of
the underlying debt increases and vice versa. (Hull 2009 p. 518—522.) The CDS price
changes reflect the changes in the investors’ perception of the risk. Thus, the CDS price
changes can be used to study the changes in a risk of, in example government bonds and
bank credit. Acharya et al. (2014) and Bocola (2016) make us of the CDS data to find
support to the mechanisms of the feedback loop.
Regarding the subject of this paper, the most interesting study is Acharya et al. (2014),
since they first present a theoretical model, that is very similar with e.g. Farhi and Tirole
(2016) and Brunnermeier et al. (2016). Then they present empirical evidence to support
the main arguments of their model using CDS data from all Eurozone and five other
European countries. They use two OLS regressions: first one to explain the prices of
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sovereign CDS’s with banking sector risk, and the second to explain the changes of the
prices of bank CDS’s with sovereign risk. A multitude of control variables are used
in regression models to rule out underlying unobserved factors that may affect both the
sovereign and the bank credit risks. The authors also put lots of effort in testing the
robustness of their results.
Empirical results of Acharya et al. (2014) provide support for two factors. First, the bank
bailouts reduced banking sector credit risk, but increased sovereign risk simultaneously.
Second, the sovereign credit risk increased the banking sector risk, but only after the crisis
had started and first bailout happened. It is interesting to notice that before the Euro crisis,
Acharya et al. find no correlation in either of their OLS-models. Also, the results show that
the correlation from bank risk to sovereign risk is stronger for riskier countries. Acharya
et al. (2014) is one of the initial papers to present a feedback loop as an explanation for
Euro crisis and to present empirics supporting the theory of it.
Bocola (2016) presents different kind of approach from all the other models and papers
presented in this chapter. He uses a neoclassical growth model enriched with a financial
sector as a theoretical framework. The model is solved numerically, due to its complexity.
Like Acharya et al. (2014), Bocola does the empirical analysis using CDS data, but only
from Italy. Another peculiarity in this study is that the empirical analysis is done using
Bayesian inference. Bocola focuses primarily on studying the effect of sovereign debt
risk on a banking sector and further on a real economy. Thus, this study contributes to
the feedback loop studies only partially. However, Bocola finds strong support for the
transmission of sovereign debt risk to banks and from banks to further to real economy,
and in that sense Bocola provides interesting insight about the real economy part of the
feedback loop as well.
In this context, it is also suitable to mention Battistini et al. (2014), which uses CDS data
from Eurozone to study home bias and the relationship between country and bank risks
using multivariate SVAR-model. This study concentrates on some of the key elements of
the feedback loop, but it is not exactly comparable to other studies presented here, since
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Battistini et al. do not present any theoretical model of the feedback loop. Like two
above-presented studies, also Battistini et al. finds evidence supporting the feedback loop
theory.
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4 One-country model
This chapter presents a one-country model which captures the logic behind the feedback
loop. The model follows Brunnermeier et al. (2016). The overall idea behind the model
is described in Chapter 3.2. This chapter first describes the general structure and some
assumptions of the model and then proceeds to formalizing the model. All detailed
calculations can be found from Mathematical appendix.
4.1 General structure and assumptions
There are four agents. First, the government, which prefers higher tax revenue over lower
one. Second, domestic depositors, who pay taxes. Depositors withdraw their deposits if a
bank becomes insolvent, unless the government bails out the bank. Third agent is banks
equity holders, who invest all their capital as banks initial equity (E0) and thus cannot
re-capitalize banks in the future. This definition simplifies the modeling of government
bailout. Fourth agent is investors, domestic and foreign, who invest in government bonds.
The investors are the ones who determine the price of the government bond. For simplicity,
all agents are assumed as risk neutral, and a risk free interest rate as zero. The model has
four periods: t = 0, 1, 2, 3. All consumption, private and public, happens at t = 3.
There are two simplifying assumptions about the government fiscal surplus behind the
model. First, governments primary surplus is assumed to be positive without a bailout
cost. Second, if the governments surplus is high, the government can fully repay its debt
even after a bailout. These assumptions are formalized later in this chapter.
4.2 Government surplus
Denote S to be the government primary surplus. With probability pi the surplus is low S
and with 1− pi high S (> S). At t = 0, the government issues a bond, with face value S,
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which means that initially government is not over-indebted, i.e. regardless of the surplus
the government can fully repay its debt at t = 0. The market value of the bond is B0.
Now denote α ∈ [0, 1] as the share of the government debt the banks buy. Hence, at t = 0
banks hold αB0 of the government debt as an asset in their balance sheet. The banks hold
, also an amount L0 of loans to the real economy. On the liability side of their balance
sheets are deposits D0 and equity E0.
Denote p as the probability at which a sunspot occurs at period t = 1. This sunspot is
purely random and does not contain any information about the state of the economy, e.g.
current or future surplus of the government. Now, if a sunspot occurs, investors become
pessimistic and reprice the government bond. Denote the new price with B1(< B0).
If repricing happens, banks suffer losses of α(B1 −B0). The banks end up with negative
equity and thus become insolvent, if losses exceed the equity, i.e. α(B1−B0)+E0 < 0. The
insolvency decreases lending to ψ ∈ [0, 1] share of the initial value, and the new lending
is then ψL0. Denote τ ∈ [0, 1] as a share of tax revenue which the government collects
from the banks’ lending. This can be interpreted in example as the taxes the government
collects from investments funded with loans. Now, if banks become insolvent, government
loses tax revenue on period t = 3 with the amount of τψL0 (remembering that the realized
surplus is revealed at final period t = 3). The term τψL0 is also called the effect of a
credit crunch, or simply a credit crunch.
The government must decide whether to bail out banks at period t = 2. If it does not bail
out, another similar tax loss τψL0 happens at period t = 3. The minimum size of the
required bailout is the difference between losses and the initial equity, i.e. α(B1−B0)+E0,
which can be called as the endogenous cost of bailout.
Lets assume that a bailout happens. Then, the realization of sovereign surplus at t = 3,
after the bailout, is
S − τψL0 + α(B1 −B0) + E0 := S − C, (1)
where S is a stochastic primary surplus at t = 3, without sunspot occurring, i.e. "surplus
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in a normal situation". On the right hand side of the equation 1, C denotes the total cost
of bailout. This total cost is a sum of a credit crunch and an endogenous cost of bailout
C = τψL0 − α(B1 −B0)− E0. (2)
The bailout cost 2 is essential in the model and used in example in defining the price of a
government bond in the next chapter.
4.3 Bond pricing
By definition, the government can always repay its debt, if the government surplus is high
S, even after bailing out banks. Now, if the surplus is low S, the government can only pay
S−C after a bailout, remembering that S was also the face value of the bond. This means
that the market value of the bond at t = 1, is relative to the expectation of the surplus.
Noticing that neither a bond repricing nor a government surplus realization happens at
period t = 2, the bond value at t = 1 is the expected value of it at t = 3
B1 = E(B3) = (1− pi)S + pi(S − C) = S − piC. (3)
Denote ∆1 := piC to present the price discount of the bond. The value of the bond in the
first period t = 0 is the expected value of the bond at t = 1. This value is relative to the
probability of the sunspot. If the sunspot does not occur, repricing does not happen and
the bond price is its face value, but if sunspot occurs, the price is the expected value after
repricing, which is calculated in 3. Thus, the bond value at t = 0 is
B0 = E(B1) = (1− p)S + p(S − piC) = S − ppiC. (4)
Again, denote ∆0 := ppiC to present the price discount. Now, the banks suffer losses due
to bond price decrease as
B1 −B0 = S − piC − (S − ppiC) = −(1− p)piC = −(1− p)∆1. (5)
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Combining the bailout cost equation 2 with equation 5, the price discount ∆1 can be
presented as
∆1 = piC = pi[τψL0 − α(B1 −B0)− E0)] = pi[τψL0 − α(−(1− p)∆1)− E0)], (6)
and solved with respect to ∆1
∆1 =
pi(τψL0 − E0)
1− piα(1− p) . (7)
Now, equation 7 presents the price discount without using the market prices B0 or B1.
Next, this equation is used in defining the conditions for the feedback loop.
4.4 Feedback loop
The banks need bailout, if banks’ equity is negative after bond repricing, i.e.
α(B1 −B0) + E0 < 0, (8)
which, when plugging in the price loss equation 5, becomes
α(−(1− p)∆1) + E0 < 0 (9)
and further replacing ∆1 with the exact price discount in 7 results
− α(1− p)pi(τψL0 − E0)
1− piα(1− p) + E0 < 0. (10)
The equation 10 simplifies to
α(1− p)piτψL0 > E0 (11)
Equation 11 presents an equity threshold of bailout. If inequality 11 holds, banks’ equity
is too low and they need bailout if sunspot occurs. On the other hand, the bailout is optimal
for government only if the bailout cost is lower than the tax revenue loss from not bailing
out banks. Presenting the bond price discount using equation 5 and further replacing ∆1
with its exact form 7, a new form of discount can be presented as
B1 −B0 = −(1− p)∆1 = −(1− p)pi(τψL0 − E0)
1− piα(1− p) , (12)
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which can be slightly reorganized to
B1 −B0 = − (1− p)pi
1− α(1− p)pi (τψL0 − E0) (13)
Remembering that if the government does not bail out banks, a further τψL0 credit crunch
loss happens at period t = 3. Thus, the bailout is optimal choice if the bailout cost is
lower than this credit crunch cost, i.e.
α(B1 −B0) + E0 > −τψL0, (14)
which, by plugging in 13 and reorganizing a little bit, becomes
E0 > α
(1− p)pi
1− α(1− p)pi (τψL0 − E0)− τψL0. (15)
Further simplifying equation 15 with respect to initial equity E0 results to
E0 > (2α(1− p)pi − 1)τψL0. (16)
Now, if banks’ equity is below the threshold in 11 but above the bailout condition in 16,
the sunspot leads to insolvency of the banks and they need a bailout and simultaneously
the bailout is optimal for the government. This causes the feedback loop. Because the
government primary surplus is low S, the bailout cost forces the government defaulting
part of the debt, since, like presented in chapter 4.3, the government can only pay S − C
after a bailout. This default deteriorates governments creditworthiness and leads to new
repricing of the bonds in the future resulting further losses to the banks, creating the
feedback loop.
At this point, it is important to revisit and formalize some of the assumptions described only
verbally at the beginning. First, at period t = 1 when sunspot occurs and the government
suffers a tax loss, it is assumed that even if the government surplus is low S, the tax loss is
not making the government insolvent. Formally this is presented as S − τψL0 > 0. This
assumption is necessary, because otherwise the government bailout would be completely
unrealistic at t = 2, even if the bailout condition 16 holds. Also, part of the derivation
of the model was done assuming in the background, that the banks equity is sufficiently
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small for the feedback loop. This means that, at least if banks hold all the government
debt, i.e. α = 1, the threshold condition 11 holds
α(1− p)piτψL0 > E0 ⇒ (1− p)piτψL0 > E0. (17)
This assumption was used in derivation just to make the whole scenario sensible. Of
course, if the repricing of the bond would not make banks insolvent, then the increase in
sovereign debt risk would be no problem what so ever.
Figure 4: Time-line graph of the model.
A summary of the events in the model is illustrated as a time-line in figure 4.
4.5 Preventing feedback loop in one-country model
Now the conditions required for the feedback loop are known and the requirements that
prevent the loop in the one-country model can be defined. This can be done by using the
equity threshold for bailout in equation 11. If banks’ equity is above this threshold, the
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bond repricing does not make banks insolvent, and thus the bailout is not needed when the
sunspot occurs. The first implication is of course to set a minimum equity requirement for
banks, which can be defined using the threshold equation 11. Denote E0 as equity lower
bound, which can be defined as
α(1− p)piτψL0 := E0 > E0. (18)
The banks must meet this E0 to avoid the feedback loop.
The feedback loop can occur only if the government has incentive to bailout banks. Thus,
it is also worth checking what happens to the bailout condition 16, if banks’ equity is E0.
This can be done by comparing the bailout condition in 16 with the equity lower bound in
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(2α(1− p)pi − 1)τψL0 < E0 < E0 = α(1− p)piτψL0. (19)
Remembering that α ∈ [0, 1], pi ∈ [0, 1] and τψL0 ≥ 0, the inequality in equation 19
simplifies to
α(1− p)pi < 1. (20)
Inequality in 20 holds otherwise, except the borderline case of α = pi = 1 and p = 0.
In this borderline case, the original inequality in 19 holds as equality, which means that
the government would be indifferent between bailing out banks and not. Hence, one can
conclude that if banks’ equity is E0 no-bailout is never more optimal than bailout, and
that the bailout condition holds. This further implies, that the feedback loop conditions
are otherwise present, but the equity requirement E0 prevents it.
Now, instead of setting an equity requirement for banks, the feedback loop can be prevented
by limiting banks’ sovereign exposure. Using the minimum equity equation 18 the safe
limit of banks’ holdings of government bonds can be determined as
α =
E0
(1− p)piτψL0 (21)
Now denote α to present this safe limit of the bonds in 21. The maximum amount of
sovereign debt available for banks is αS . This can be presented more accurately by
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plugging S into 21, which results
αS =
E0
(1− p)piτψL0S, (22)
which can be modified to
E0
αS
=
(1− p)piτψL0
S
. (23)
This equation 23 present the minimum ratio of banks equity to sovereign exposure.
Replacing the face value of the government bond S on the left hand side of the equation 22
with the market value of the bond, results in equation that presents the maximum amount
of safe assets available to banks
αB0 =
E0
(1− p)piτψL0S. (24)
It is clear from all the equations 22 – 24, that the equity and sovereign exposure limits are
relative to each other. So, in order to prevent the feedback loop either one needs to be
controlled with respect to the other.
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5 Two-country model
This chapter extends the one-country model to two-country version. The two-country
model in a symmetric situation in which banks in two countries hold similar portfolios
from Brunnermeier et al. (2016) is presented verbally at the beginning of this chapter
and later also formalized using the formal two-country model. The formalization of
two-country model follows the one-country model presented in Chapter 4 with some
modifications. All detailed calculations can be found from Mathematical appendix.
5.1 Symmetric two-country case
Brunnermeier et al. (2016) describe the situationwhere themodel contains another country
and set these two-countries symmetric. The sunspot probability is independent between
the two countries. Now, if banks hold only domestic bonds the situation does not change
from the one-country model. In addition to the one-country case, there is a symmetric
pool made of government bonds issued by the two countries. If banks diversify their
portfolio to contain part of this pooled asset, banks are less exposed to domestic sovereign
risk, and equity threshold is lower. This is the risk reduction benefit of diversifying.
However, if banks in both countries hold only this pooled asset, they end up with identical
portfolios. If banks’ equity is below the threshold, the repricing of either of the two bonds
affects banks in both countries. This means that also the government in a country where
sunspot did not occur needs to bail out its banks. Now identical portfolios with symmetric
countries results that country risk is transferred to another country. (Brunnermeier et al.
2016.)
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5.2 Formal two-country model
The following formalization ismy ownmodification from the one-countrymodel. The two-
country model presented here also captures the results regarding the symmetric situation
by Brunnermeier et al. (2016) described in previous chapter.
In the following formalization, notation follows the one-country model unless otherwise
mentioned. Assume two similar countries. Both countries follow the model presented in
chapter 4. The probability of sunspot for the first country is p, and probability of a low
fiscal surplus S is pi as earlier. The same probabilities for the second country are q and ρ
respectively. These probabilities are independent from each other.
Banks are assumed to be free to choose their investment portfolio to consist of domestic
bonds and foreign bonds. If banks hold only domestic bonds, the situation equals the
one-country model. Now, denote P as portfolio that domestic banks choose of two bonds
such that P0 = (αB0, βB∗0), where α and β (α, β ∈ [0, 1]) are the shares of domestic and
foreign sovereign debt the banks hold. Following the one-country model, B0 and B∗0 are
the market prices of domestic and foreign bonds at period t = 0 respectively, while the P0
is the value of the whole portfolio at period t = 0. Here and onwards the superscript ” ∗ ”
denotes foreign country variables.
First, two different portfolios can be compared. First portfolio contains only domestic
bonds P0 = (α1B0), while the other one contains both domestic and foreign bonds
Pˆ0 = (α2B0, βB
∗
0). If investment size is equal, i.e. P0 = Pˆ0, the comparison results to
(α1 − α2)B0 = βB∗0 . (25)
Clearly, when β > 0 in equation 25 means that α2 < α1 (B0 and B∗0 are assumed to be
positive in this context). This shows the simple result that diversification reduces banks’
exposure to domestic sovereign debt.
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5.3 Cost of bailout and portfolio pricing
Similarly with equations 1 and 2 in the one-country model, the total cost of bailout, can
be defined as the difference between banks’ initial equity and the sum of credit crunch
and endogenous bailout cost. The endogenous bailout cost is the loss from repricing the
portfolio, which is calculated similarly than when repricing a single bond. So, the total
cost is
C = τψL0 − (P1 − P0)− E0. (26)
The portfolio pricing can be derived using similar backwards induction than in the bond
pricing in the one-country model. The price at period t = 1 is the expectation of the value
at final period t = 3, and the price at t = 0 is the expected price at t = 1. Individual
bonds in the portfolio are priced according to equations 3 and 4. Now the prices for the
whole portfolio can be determined as
P1 = E(P3) = αE(B3) + βE(B
∗
3) = α(S − piC) + β(S∗ − ρC∗) (27)
and
P0 = E(P1) = αE(B1) + βE(B
∗
1) = α(S − ppiC) + β(S∗ − qρC∗) (28)
Using these prices, the price discount of the whole portfolio is
P1 − P0 = [α(S − piC) + β(S∗ − ρC∗)]− [α(S − ppiC) + β(S∗ − qρC∗)]
= −α(1− p)piC − β(1− q)ρC∗
:= −α(1− p)∆1 − β(1− q)∆∗1,
(29)
where ∆1 = piC and ∆∗1 = ρC∗ denote the price discount of the domestic and foreign
bond respectively.
5.4 Equity threshold and feedback loop
Previous chapter presented the price discount of the portfolio. Now, similarly with the
one-country situation, the feedback loop occurs only, if banks are left with negative equity
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after portfolio repricing, i.e. they need a bailout. Using the bailout cost and the portfolio
discount equations 26 and 29, the equity threshold can be solved. To make mathematical
presentation a bit simpler, assume first that foreign bond discount ∆∗1 is unknown and the
domestic bond discount ∆1 is solved with respect to ∆∗1,
∆1 = piC = pi[τψL0 − (P1 − P0)− E0], (30)
which becomes, when the portfolio repricing is replaced with the exact form from equation
29,
∆1 = pi[τψL0 + α(1− p)∆1 + β(1− q)∆∗1 − E0], (31)
and which by simply solving ∆1 to the left hand side of the equation becomes
∆1 =
pi[τψL0 + β(1− q)∆∗1 − E0]
1− αpi(1− p) . (32)
Now plugging 32 back into portfolio discount equation 29 results
P1 − P0 = −α(1− p)pi[τψL0 + β(1− q)∆
∗
1 − E0]
1− αpi(1− p) − β(1− q)∆
∗
1. (33)
The banks end up with negative equity if portfolio price drop exceeds original equity.
P1 − P0 + E0 < 0, (34)
which can be presented using the exact portfolio discount equation 33,
− α(1− p)pi[τψL0 + β(1− q)∆
∗
1 − E0]
1− αpi(1− p) − β(1− q)∆
∗
1 + E0 < 0, (35)
which simplifies, after some straightforward steps, to
α(1− p)piτψL0 + β(1− q)∆∗1 > E0 := E0. (36)
In equation 36 E0 denotes again the minimum equity required to avoid the feedback loop.
So eventually, the equity threshold 36 that prevents the feedback loop is similar than in
the one-country model, but this time the foreign bond discount is added. However, since
there is the also foreign debt exposure, the sunspot in either of the two countries results to
the feedback loop, if banks’ aggregate equity is below the threshold in 36. If the sunspot
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occurs in the foreign country and the equity of domestic banks is below the threshold,
some discount ∆∗1 occurs and the domestic government must bail out banks. This presents
one form of the risk contagion that Brunnermeier et al. (2016) describe in a symmetric
case.
5.5 Effect of foreign country
In previous chapter, the foreign bond discount ∆∗1 was assumed unknown. This discount
depends on the structure of the foreign country, which can be specified more precisely to
see how the foreign debt actually affects the domestic banks. Since both countries follow
the same structure with different parameters, the foreign bond discount is similar with
equation 32, but with foreign country’s parameters, which are: probability of low fiscal
surplus ρ, probability of sunspot q, share of domestic and foreign debt the banks hold α∗
and β∗ and banks initial lending and equity L∗0 and E∗0 . The exact form of discount is then
∆∗1 =
ρ[τψL∗0 + β
∗(1− p)∆1 − E∗0 ]
1− α∗ρ(1− q) . (37)
To be exact with the notation, notice, that the share of domestic bond B0 that domestic
banks hold is α and the share of foreign banks’ holdings is β∗. Similarly the shares of
bond B∗0 are β and α∗.
First, assume that banks in foreign country are allowed to invest only to the foreign
government bonds, i.e. their home country’s bonds. Then the term β∗(1−p)∆1 disappears
from equation 37 and the equity threshold follows the one-country model (see equation
11 and chapter 4.4 for details). Now, if banks in the foreign country fulfill their equity
threshold, by plugging the minimum equity equation 11 to 37 and using that in equation
36, the domestic banks’ equity threshold simplifies to a sum of domestic and foreign equity
thresholds weighted with the exposure parameters, i.e.
E0 = α(1− p)piτψL0 + β(1− q)ρτψL∗0, (38)
where τψL∗0 is the size of a credit crunch in the foreign country. This situation is of course
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very special and limited, even somewhat unrealistic, but since the end result 38 is simple,
it is useful in analysis and interpretation.
The general case where both countries are similar and banks are able to invest in the foreign
and domestic bonds creates a cross dependence between countries. In this situation, it
is assumed that both governments issue enough bonds such that banks in both countries
can buy them. More precisely α + β∗ ≤ 1 and β + α∗ ≤ 1, remembering that the model
contains also other investors besides banks, hence the inequality.
Now, the domestic bond discount, ∆1 is 32 and foreign, ∆∗1 is 37 and the equity threshold
is 36. Using these equations, the exact equity threshold can be solved, but the end
results contains quite intricate coefficients. So, to keep equations more comprehensible,
the following presentation contains additional notations. First, the familiar coefficient of
domestic credit crunch is renamed: α(1 − p)pi := A ∈ [0, 1] and with foreign weight
parameter α∗(1 − p)pi := A∗ ∈ [0, 1]. Second, two technical coefficients containing
products of parameters α, β, α∗, β∗, pi, ρ, p and q are named as Θ ∈]0, 1[ and Λ ∈ [0, 1[ 3.
The exact derivation of the following equation is in Mathematical appendix. Using these
notational modifications the equity lower bound in the general case, where banks in both
countries hold bonds of both governments, becomes
E0 =
(Θ− Λ)A
Θ
τψL0 +
β(1− q)ρ
Θ
[(1− A)(τψL∗0 − E∗0) + β∗(1− p)piτψL0]. (39)
Notice that, in equation 39, Θ > 0, which makes the equation valid with all the parameter
values. The reason is that αpi(1 − p) < 1 and α∗ρ(1 − q) < 1 in this context, because
α < 1 and α∗ < 1 since both of the bonds are held by the banks from both of the countries.
Remembering that e.g. α = 1 would mean that the domestic banks would hold the whole
domestic sovereign debt.
Now, the equity threshold 39 is affected by foreign bond repricing, i.e. credit crunch
τψL∗0, but also the equity of the foreign banks E∗0 . No additional assumptions about this
foreign equity is done, so it can be considered as an unknown variable, since solving also
this equity would lead to excessively complex equations. The first part of sum in 39 is
3Precisely: Θ = (1− αpi(1− p))(1− α∗ρ(1− q)) and Λ = ρβ∗(1− p)piβ(1− q)
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interpreted as the effect of a domestic bond holdings and the latter part as the effect of
foreign bond holdings. It is important to notice that the domestic bond repricing, i.e. the
credit crunch τψL0, is present in the second part of the sum as well. This means that part
of the domestic bond repricing also affects now through the foreign bond holdings, since
the foreign banks hold these same bonds as well.
The general form of equity threshold in equation 39 allows to study an another special
case: the situation where the domestic banks only invest in the foreign bonds. This means
that there is no direct exposure to the domestic sovereign debt. Technically this is done by
setting α = 0, which implies that A = 0 and Θ = 1− α∗ρ(1− q). Then equity threshold
39 becomes
E0 =
β(1− q)ρ
1− α∗ρ(1− q) [(τψL
∗
0 − E∗0) + β∗(1− p)piτψL0]. (40)
The first part of the sum in 39 disappears, since there is nomore direct holdings of domestic
bonds. However, in 40 there is still the effect of domestic credit crunch τψL0 relative to
probability of low domestic surplus pi. The reason is that foreign banks hold bonds of
both governments and the risk of both countries affects the risk of foreign banks’ portfolio.
Then the possible portfolio repricing affects the pricing of the foreign bond. Hence, the
domestic sovereign risk reflects, through the foreign bond holdings, back to the domestic
banks, even when the banks do not have direct exposure to the domestic sovereign debt.
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6 Banking union
One of the recent developments in the European integration is the creation of a banking
union. The reason for progressing towards the banking union in Eurozone is especially
to prevent the feedback loop. The banking union consist of several different institutions,
but in this context the interesting part is the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), which
is responsible for the bailout decision if a bank fails. The bailouts are funded by a Single
Resolution Fund, thus removing the cost from the member states of the union. The
resolution fund is financed by banking sector. (European Comission 2015a.)
This chapter presents my own formal model of the banking union. The focus of the model
is especially to study the effects that the banking union has in the bailout situations and its
ability to prevent the feedback loop. The model covers the maximum cost of the banking
union, the methods to collect funds from member states and different bailout scenarios.
The model is based on the two-country model presented in previous chapter 5.
6.1 Cost of banking union
The banking union model is based on the two-country model presented in chapter 5. First,
assume that the countries in the two-country model belong to a banking union, which
is responsible for bailouts. In this context, the banking union is assumed not to have
any other duties than to bailout insolvent banks. The first result is very straightforward.
Assume that the sunspot still occurs as before and a repricing of banks’ portfolios may
result the banks to become insolvent. When governments are no longer responsible for
the bailouts, the endogenous cost of bailout is removed from the cost equation 26, so the
effect of credit crunch is the only cost that remains for the sovereign, thus
C = τψL0. (41)
But, already the one-country model was build with the assumption that even if the gov-
ernment surplus is low, S, the tax loss is not making the government insolvent, i.e.
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S− τψL0 > 0. This means that the banking union would break the bank to sovereign link
in the model, if it covers to whole bailout cost.
Now, assume that a membership in the banking union is not free. Even though in SRM the
resolution fund is financed by banks, some indirect cost can still be imposed to sovereigns.
Assume that the banking union fee is relative to banks initial lendingL0. Denote ω ∈ [0, 1]
as a share, which the banking union collects from banks to resolution fund, which finances
the bailouts. This fee is collected at period t = 0, i.e. before the possible sunspot
occurrence. The cost ωL0 to banks further results in τ share decrease in tax revenue
from lending. In the model, this mechanism corresponds the credit crunch in reprising
situation, when banks cut their lending in an insolvency situation. This tax loss is the cost
of banking union to sovereign. On the other hand, the lending decrease means that the
initial lending is now only (1− ω)L0 compared to original situation without the banking
union cost. This further reduces the cost of credit crunch in a case of bailout. Now, the
total cost of bailout to sovereign, including the banking union cost, is
C = τψ(1− ω)L0 + τωL0 = τψL0 + (1− ψ)τωL0, (42)
in which the first term τψ(1− ω)L0 is the credit crunch from insolvency and second term
τωL0 is the cost of the banking union membership.
The membership in banking union is profitable to the sovereign if the cost in 42 is lower
than the cost of bailout without banking union in the equation 26, e.g.
τψL0 + (1− ψ)τωL0 < τψL0 − (P1 − P0)− E0, (43)
which can be simplified to
− (1− ψ)τωL0 > P1 − P0 + E0. (44)
This inequality comparison requires of course a simplifying assumption that the banking
union cost is collected only one time, and the bailout cost happens only one time. These
assumption correspond the flow of events in one- and two-country models presented
previously. Hence, the banking union model is consistent with the two-country model in
this case.
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The right hand side of the equation 44 is familiar from the equation 34, the inequality can
be solved similarly than in equations 34–36. If the the left hand side of equation 44 is kept
untouched, except the change of sign, the result is
(1− ψ)τωL0 < α(1− p)piτψL0 + β(1− q)∆
∗
1 − E0
1− αpi(1− p) . (45)
On the right hand side of equation 45 are the cost of repricing the domestic bond, in which
the parameter α is the share of domestic sovereign debt the banks hold, p the sunspot
probability parameter and pi the low fiscal surplus probability parameter, and foreign bond
discount relative to share of foreign debt the banks hold β and the sunspot probability in
foreign country q.
From equation 45, the upper bound to the banking union share of lending, ω, can be solved
with respect to other parameters. The result, with slight reorganizing, is
ω <
α(1− p)piψ
(1− αpi(1− p))(1− ψ) +
β(1− q)∆∗1 − E0
(1− αpi(1− p))(1− ψ)τL0 . (46)
This gives the maximum share of lending that the banking union membership can cost.
ω in 46 is increasing in α and β, since bigger exposure to sovereign debt, domestic or
foreign, increases the bailout cost, and decreasing in E0, because the bigger equity means
that the banks are able to cover lager share of the losses themselves. ω is also increasing
in pi, and noticing that ∆∗1 is presented in the equation 37, also increasing in ρ, meaning
the larger the probability of low fiscal surplus, domestic or foreign, the higher the price of
banking union can be. Interestingly ω is decreasing in τ and L0. This is due to higher tax
revenue, presented by τL0. When the sovereign is able to collect more tax revenue from
banks’ lending the same share ω results in larger actual losses. Finally ω is decreasing in
sunspot probability p and q, since the repricing risk is more priced into the higher sunspot
probability bonds, and increasing in ψ, since the larger the credit crunch from insolvency
the higher the bailout cost would be to a sovereign without the banking union.
Similarly the maximum share of lending to second country (foreign country) ω∗ is deter-
mined with respect to foreign country parameters
ω∗ <
α∗(1− q)ρψ
(1− α∗ρ(1− q))(1− ψ) +
β∗(1− p)∆1 − E∗0
(1− α∗ρ(1− q))(1− ψ)τL∗0
. (47)
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The endogenous cost of bailout, i.e. the difference between banks negative equity and
portfolio repricing losses, is now moved from the sovereigns to banking union. Because
the banking union is not affected by credit crunch, unlike the sovereign, the cost of bailout
to the banking union is simply the banks’ negative equity and nothing else. Condition for
the banks’ negative equity is presented in equation 34. By replacing he portfolio discount
with the exact form from equation 33, the bailout cost of first country’s banks to the
banking union becomes
C = α(1− p)pi[τψL0 + β(1− q)∆
∗
1 − E0]
1− αpi(1− p) + β(1− q)∆
∗
1 − E0, (48)
which simplifies to
C =
α(1− p)piτψL0 + β(1− q)∆∗1 − E0
1− αpi(1− p) . (49)
The cost of bailout of second country’s banks is similar with foreign country parameters
C∗ =
α∗(1− q)ρτψL∗0 + β∗(1− p)∆1 − E∗0
1− α∗ρ(1− q) . (50)
6.2 Banking union funds
In previous chapter, the maximum cost of banking union membership to sovereign was
presented in equation 45. This also gives a limit to funds that the banking union can
collect. The banking union fee was ωL0. The maximum fee can be solved from equation
45. This maximum fee is the limit that sovereigns are willing to pay for the membership,
i.e. the membership is still profitable to them. Simply by multiplying L0 from right hand
side to left in equation 45, the higher bound for fee becomes
ωL0 <
α(1− p)piψL0 + β(1− q)∆∗1 − E0
(1− αpi(1− p))(1− ψ)τ . (51)
If equation 51 holds as equality the sovereign is indifferent in joining the banking union.
Then, the right hand side of the equation 51 can be seen as the absolute maximum of the
banking union fee. Denote this limit ωL0 and similarly for the second country as ω∗L∗0.
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This gives the maximum total amount of funds that the banking union can acquire. Denote
this amount of maximum funds as F , which is then
F = ωL0 + ω∗L∗0, (52)
and by replacing the maximum fees with the exact equations
F =
α(1− p)piψL0 + β(1− q)∆∗1 − E0
(1− αpi(1− p))(1− ψ)τ +
α∗(1− q)ρψL∗0 + β∗(1− p)∆1 − E∗0
(1− α∗ρ(1− q))(1− ψ)τ . (53)
The equation 53 is the borderline case of the banking union funds, which gives the
maximum that is still feasible to member states. Since the banking union membership fee
causes credit crunch that represses the economy in the member state, the banking union
may not find it reasonable to charge the maximum fees presented in equations 52 and 53.
One possible alternative is that the banking union fee is a fixed fraction of the maximum
fee. Denote this fraction as µ and assume that µ is not country specific. Now, the banking
union funds are
F = µF = µωL0 + µω∗L∗0, (54)
and by replacing the maximum fees with the exact equations
F = µ
α(1− p)piψL0 + β(1− q)∆∗1 − E0
(1− αpi(1− p))(1− ψ)τ + µ
α∗(1− q)ρψL∗0 + β∗(1− p)∆1 − E∗0
(1− α∗ρ(1− q))(1− ψ)τ .
(55)
Second alternative is that the share of lending ω is not set country specifically, but the same
share is used for both of the countries. Denote this general share as ω. Clearly, it must
be selected such that ω = min{ω, ω∗}, because higher value would mean that joining
banking union is not profitable to either one of the countries. In this case the banking
union funds are
F = ωL0 + ωL
∗
0. (56)
In example, if ω = ω the banking union funds can be presented as
F =
α(1− p)piψL0 + β(1− q)∆∗1 − E0
(1− αpi(1− p))(1− ψ)τ + µˆ
α∗(1− q)ρψL∗0 + β∗(1− p)∆1 − E∗0
(1− α∗ρ(1− q))(1− ψ)τ .
(57)
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In equation 57 the µˆ is not exogenously chosen like µ in 55, but presents the difference
between ω∗L∗0 and ωL∗0 such that
µˆω∗L∗0 = ωL
∗
0, (58)
from which the µˆ can be solved as
µˆ =
ω
ω∗
. (59)
Equations 58 and 59 show that µˆ can be interpreted as the fraction of the maximum
banking union fee for the second country. In that sense, it is congruent with µ in equations
54 and 55.
6.3 Bailout scenarios in banking union
This chapter presents the different bailout scenarios when the banking union funds are
collected using those methods presented in previous chapter 6.2. Because the banking
union is a supranational institution, it is inaccurate to refer to two countries in the model
as domestic and foreign as is done previously when presenting the two-country model.
That is why in this chapter they are called simply as country one and two, where country
one corresponds the domestic and two foreign in previous presentation. In two country
setup there is three possible bailout situations for the banking union, which are: banks in
country one need to be bailed out, banks in country two need to be bailed out or banks in
both countries need to be bailed out simultaneously. Of course, the first two scenarios are
identical because both countries follow similar model with only parametric differences.
Also, there is the fourth situation that no bailout is needed at all, but that is uninteresting
in this context.
To be successful in bailing out banks, the banking union needs to posses enough funds
to finance the bailout. This means that the total cost of bailout CTOT is lower than the
banking union funds, i.e.
CTOT ≤ F, (60)
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which in worst-case scenario is
CTOT = C + C∗ ≤ F, (61)
meaning banks in both countries need a bailout simultaneously.
The first alternative is that banking union fee is the maximum that is still affordable to
member states. Then, the amount of funds in the banking union is the absolute maximum
that the union can collect, F . Now, the comparison of bailout cost and banking union
funds, using equations 61 and 52 becomes
CTOT = C + C∗ ≤ F ⇔ C + C∗ ≤ ωL0 + ω∗L∗0. (62)
In this case the comparison of costs and funds can be simply done by comparing first the
cost of bailout in country one with fees payed by banks from country one, e.g. taking only
first part of 62
C ≤ ωL0. (63)
This can be done more precisely by taking the exact forms from equations 49 and 53 which
results
α(1− p)piτψL0 + β(1− q)∆∗1 − E0
1− αpi(1− p)
≤
α(1− p)piψL0 + β(1− q)∆∗1 − E0
(1− αpi(1− p))(1− ψ)τ .
(64)
Noticing that (1− ψ)τ ∈ [0, 1] by definition, the inequality in 64 always holds. Of course
the same result applies to country two, since the two countries in the model are similar.
This means that when the banking union collects the maximum fees, the funds acquired
from a country always exceeds the cost of bailout of the banks in that country. There are
two reasons for this result. First, the banking union does not suffer from credit crunch like
sovereign does in bailout situation, thus the term (1−ψ) on the right hand side of equation
64. The second reason is that the banking union fee only affects the sovereign relative to
the share of taxes lost due to the banking union membership fee, which is presented by
the term τ . Hence, the maximum funds are enough to cover bailout costs, even if banks in
both countries need the bailout simultaneously.
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The second alternative is that the banking union fee is only a fixed fraction of themaximum.
This situation is presented in equations 54 and 55. First, the scenario where banks in
country one need a bailout can be presented similarly than the previous scenario in 63, i.e.
C ≤ µωL0. (65)
Following the equation 64, the exact form of cost is 49, which is this time compared to
funds equation 55
α(1− p)piτψL0 + β(1− q)∆∗1 − E0
1− αpi(1− p)
≤
µ
α(1− p)piψL0 + β(1− q)∆∗1 − E0
(1− αpi(1− p))(1− ψ)τ .
(66)
Clearly if µ ≥ (1−ψ)τ , inequality 66 holds. Again, the same result applies to comparison
with country two. So, the situation does not change from previous maximum funds case
and the banking union is always successful in bailouts.
Now, if µ < (1 − ψ)τ in 66 the fees paid from country one are not enough for bailout
costs of that country’s banks. Noticing that all of these parameters ψ (decrease in lending
due insolvency), τ (share of taxes collected from lending) and µ (share of the maximum
banking union fee) are common for both countries, the same result applies to country two
as well. The immediate implication is that in this case the banking union cannot afford
to bail out banks from both countries simultaneously. However, the bailout of banks in
country one is successful if funds from both countries are larger than the cost of bailout
of banks from country one, i.e. if
α(1− p)piτψL0 + β(1− q)∆∗1 − E0
1− αpi(1− p)
≤
µ
α(1− p)piψL0 + β(1− q)∆∗1 − E0
(1− αpi(1− p))(1− ψ)τ
+
µ
α∗(1− q)ρψL∗0 + β∗(1− p)∆1 − E∗0
(1− α∗ρ(1− q))(1− ψ)τ .
(67)
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This equation 67 simplifies to
(1− µ
(1− ψ)τ )
α(1− p)piτψL0 + β(1− q)∆∗1 − E0
1− αpi(1− p)
≤
µ
α∗(1− q)ρψL∗0 + β∗(1− p)∆1 − E∗0
(1− α∗ρ(1− q))(1− ψ)τ .
(68)
Now, on the left hand side of 68 is a coefficient from exogenous parameters and the bailout
cost bailout of country one, while the right hand side is funds gathered from the country
two. In simple terms this can be expressed as
(1− µ
(1− ψ)τ )C ≤ µω
∗L∗0. (69)
Equation 69 states that, after all the funds collected from country one are used, the
remainder of the bailout cost must be less or equal than the funds collected from country
two. One of the key factors that define whether 69 holds is the amount of initial lending
in the two countries L0 and L∗0, which can also be interpreted as a proxy for the size of a
banking sector in that country. So, in this case, if L∗0 is sufficiently small, it is possible that
the banking union fails to bailout the banks in country one entirely, and on the contrary the
banking union can afford to bail out banks in country two, due to smaller banking sector
and thus smaller bailout cost.
The third alternative to collect funds is that banking union uses the same share ω for both
countries. Assume that in this case the smaller share is ω and thus chosen as the general
share, formally ω = ω. Then, the banking union funds can be presented as in equations
56. If banks in country one need bailout, the banking union can afford to do it if
C ≤ ωL0 + ωL∗0 = ωL0 + µˆω∗L∗0. (70)
Replacing the bailout cost and the funds collected from country one with the exact equa-
tions from 49 and 57, while keeping the equation for funds collected from country two as
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they are in 70, the comparison becomes
α(1− p)piτψL0 + β(1− q)∆∗1 − E0
1− αpi(1− p)
≤
α(1− p)piψL0 + β(1− q)∆∗1 − E0
(1− αpi(1− p))(1− ψ)τ
+
µˆω∗L∗0.
(71)
It is directly seen from 71 that situation of country one corresponds to maximum funds
case. This means that inequality 71 always holds for country one, i.e. the banking union
is always able to bail out banks in country one. The more interesting situation is then the
one, in which the bailout is needed for banks in country two. Formally the comparison is
then
C∗ ≤ ωL0 + µˆω∗L∗0 (72)
Now, replacing the cost and funds with exact forms from the equations 50 and 57, the
comparison between cost and funds becomes
α∗(1− q)ρτψL∗0 + β∗(1− p)∆1 − E∗0
1− α∗ρ(1− q)
≤
α(1− p)piψL0 + β(1− q)∆∗1 − E0
(1− αpi(1− p))(1− ψ)τ
+
µˆ
α∗(1− q)ρψL∗0 + β∗(1− p)∆1 − E∗0
(1− α∗ρ(1− q))(1− ψ)τ .
(73)
In this case, the situation corresponds to previous scenario, in which only a fraction of the
maximum, µ, was used when defining the banking union membership fee. So, similarly
with that scenario, also here if µˆ ≥ (1− ψ)τ , the inequality 73 always holds, since funds
collected from country two exceed the cost of bailout of banks in country two. In the
opposite situation µˆ < (1 − ψ)τ , the solution can be done similarly with equations 67 –
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69 to get the simplified equation
(1− µˆ
(1− ψ)τ )C
∗ ≤ ωL0. (74)
Interpretation is also similar than earlier. If the reminder of the cost, after using all the
funds collected from country two is less or equal than funds collected from country one,
the bailout is successful.
The case of bailout in country two extends to final situation where both countries need
bailout simultaneously. The banking union possesses enough funds to do this worst-case
bailout if
C + C∗ ≤ ωL0 + µˆω∗L∗0, (75)
which is in the exact forms, from equations 49, 50 and 57
α(1− p)piτψL0 + β(1− q)∆∗1 − E0
1− αpi(1− p)
+
α∗(1− q)ρτψL∗0 + β∗(1− p)∆1 − E∗0
1− α∗ρ(1− q)
≤
α(1− p)piψL0 + β(1− q)∆∗1 − E0
(1− αpi(1− p))(1− ψ)τ
+
µˆ
α∗(1− q)ρψL∗0 + β∗(1− p)∆1 − E∗0
(1− α∗ρ(1− q))(1− ψ)τ .
(76)
Equation 76 can be simplified by grouping terms similarly than is done e.g. in equations
67 – 69. After moving all terms to the left hand side of the equation and replacing cost
equations with their simple notations, the result is
(1− 1
(1− ψ)τ )C + (1−
µˆ
(1− ψ)τ )C
∗ ≤ 0. (77)
In equation 77, the first term is certainly negative or zero, since (1 − ψ)τ ≤ 1. The sign
of the second term is ambiguous. If µˆ < (1− ψ)τ , the second term is positive. If the first
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term is at the same time strictly negative, the overall result depends on the sizes of the first
and second terms. There is no straightforward interpretation of this case anymore, because
the sign of the final summation in 77 depends on many variables within the costs C and
C∗. In general, the major factors are the relative size of banking sectors in two countries
presented by L0 and L∗0, but also the solvency of the banking sector within a country
e.g. the size of L0 compared to E0. How different parameters affect the banking union
membership fee and thus the amount of funds it has, are presented in previous chapters
6.1 and 6.2, while the factors affecting the cost of bailout are explained in detail as part of
the two-country model in chapter 5.3.
Finally, consider a situation in latter two cases where the banking union does not have
enough funds to bail out banks in both countries. For simplicity, assume that the cost
of bailout in country one equals the whole banking union funds, i.e. C = F , and that
the worst case happens and the banks in country two need bailout as well. Assume also
that the banking union fee is µ fraction of the maximum fee denoted here as ω. Now, the
banking union bails out the banks in country one, but the government in country two must
decide whether it bails out the banks in country two or not. In this case the bailout cost to
sovereign becomes
C∗ = τψ(1− µω∗)L∗0 − (P ∗1 − P ∗0 )− E∗0 + µτω∗L∗0, (78)
in which the total cost consists of credit crunch from banks’ insolvency (the first term in
78), a bailout cost and the credit crunch from the banking union membership fee (last
term in 78). This cost can be compared to the bailout cost without the banking union
membership, which is presented in equation 26, e.g. in equality
τψL∗0 − (P ∗1 − P ∗0 )− E∗0 = τψ(1− µω∗)L∗0 − (P ∗1 − P ∗0 )− E∗0 + µτω∗L∗0 (79)
Equation 79 simplifies with couple of straightforward calculation steps (calculation details
in Mathematical appendix) into a simple equation
0 = (1− ψ)µω∗. (80)
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The equality in 80 holds only if ψ = 1 or µω = 0. The former would mean, that banks
insolvency would cut out the whole lending of the bank and the latter, that the banking
union membership is free. So either way the equality is very extreme borderline case.
Notice also that the right hand side of 80 is by definition always non-negative. This means
that also the right hand side of equation 79 is always larger or equal than the left hand
side. This in turn means that the bailout cost to the sovereign is larger or equally large as
a member of the banking union than outside of it. In the case when the banking union
fails to cover any part of the bailout cost of country two, the banking union membership
is most likely disadvantageous for country two.
6.4 Consistency of banking union model
The banking union model presented here is based on the two-country model in chapter 5.
Hence, the banking union model needs to be consistent with the two-country model. In
this regard, the use of banking union funds needs further examination. Consider situation
in which the sunspot occurs and the banking union does a bailout using all of its funds.
Now, if the banking union funds cover exactly the whole bailout cost, the sovereign does
not need to do anything and the banks lose the funds collected by the banking union. This
corresponds the situation in the two-country model, in which the sovereign surplus is high,
S, and the sovereign always remains solvent. The same applies, if the banking union does
not have enough funds and the sovereign needs to pay part of the bailout, but it remains
solvent. In the worst-case scenario, the sovereign pays part of the bailout and its solvency
deteriorates, then the feedback loop occurs. All of these situations are consistent between
the banking union model and the two-country model.
The second alternative is that the sunspots do not occur in neither of the countries, or the
banking union bails out banks but has more funds than the bailout costs are. This leaves all
or some of the banking union funds unused. Without additional assumptions, this would
mean that this banking union surplus simply disappears at period t = 3. To be consistent
with the two-country model, assume that the banking union returns all surplus back to the
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banks at period t = 3 in correct shares between countries. Now, if sunspots do not occur, all
of the membership fees are returned to the banks, and situation corresponds to a stochastic
primary surplus realization in the two-country model, i.e. "surplus in a normal situation".
In latter case in which some funds are used to bailout banks, the situation corresponds to
the high sovereign surplus situation, in which the sovereign always remains solvent.
Figure 5: Time-line of the banking union model.
The time-line of essential events in the banking union model, including the above made
assumption of returning surplus funds to banks, is presented in Figure 5. At t = 0 the
banking union fee is collected from banks, which results a tax loss to sovereign. For the
sovereign, this tax loss is permanent, even though the whole fee may be returned to the
banks at period t = 3. Hence, the tax loss does not depend on the sunspot probability.
For the banks, the occurrence of sunspot results to losses. If these losses are larger than
the banks’ initial equity, the banks need a bailout. The banking union performs a bailout
at period t = 2. If the banking union does not possess enough funds to pay the whole
bailout, the sovereigns may decide to complete the bailout. Now, this sovereign bailout
happens at the same period t = 2 than the banking unions bailout. This is consistent
with the assumption that all information is available to all agents in the model, hence the
sovereign is able to do the bailout decision parallel with the banking union. By defining
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that the unused funds are returned to banks, the banking union model is consistent with
the one- and two-country models, on which it is built.
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7 Analysis
This chapter contains analysis based on the one- and two-country models presented in
Chapters 4 and 5. Both models show that banks’ aggregate equity and the exposure to
sovereign debt are key factors in the occurrence, but especially in the prevention of the
feedback loop. The two-country model also shows that risk may transfer from country to
another. The banking union cuts the bailout channel, and thus prevents the feedback loop
in the model.
7.1 Feedback loop in one-country model
The conditions when the feedback loop occurs in the one-country model are solved in
Chapter 4.4. The essential factor is banks’ aggregate equity. If the equity is low, below
the threshold in equation 11, but sufficiently large such that a bailout is an optimal choice,
i.e. above the bailout limit in 16, the sovereign bond repricing leads to a feedback loop.
The second important factor for the feedback loop is the situation of sovereign’s economy.
In the model, this is presented by the probability of low fiscal surplus pi. Low surplus
causes a budget deficit to sovereign, if it faces additional costs, a bailout cost and a tax
reduction due to a credit crunch. Hence, the equity threshold 11 is increasing in pi. The
bond price difference equation 13 shows that the price drop is bigger the bigger the pi is.
The low surplus leads to a bigger price drop and thus more equity is required from banks.
Thirdly, the equity threshold is increasing in sovereign debt exposure presented by param-
eter α. This is a rather obvious outcome, since the larger is the share of the sovereign debt,
the larger is the effect of the repricing of that debt. Since banks can choose the amount of
bonds they buy, i.e. decide the exposure level α, and they can affect the amount of equity
they possess, the solution to feedback loop in equation 23 is solved and presented as a
minimum ratio of banks’ exposure to equity.
Finally, the last factor affecting the feedback loop is the risk level of sovereign debt, which
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is presented with the probability of sunspot p. The higher sunspot probability means
that investors are more likely to become pessimistic about the sovereign’s economic
development. This can be interpreted as a higher overall risk level of sovereign debt. Now
in the model, all the probabilities are known by all the agents, thus when the bond prices
are calculated in Chapter 4.3 the sunspot probability is taken into account. This means
that higher sunspot probability, higher risk, leads to a lower bond price. The lower price
leads to a smaller price drop when sunspot occurs e.g. in 13, and that is why the equity
threshold is decreasing in sunspot probability p. In general, this is an interesting result,
because it means also that safer bonds require more equity from banks, since very unlikely
sunspot is less priced.
The one-countrymodel also shows that bailout is the optimal choice, if the cost frombailout
is less that the cost of no-bailout decision. This bailout condition is presented as equation
16 and it behaves similarly than the equity threshold with respect to different parameters.
So, the lower limit of profitable bailout increases when the exposure to sovereign debt
or the probability of low government surplus increases, and decreases when sunspot
probability increases. Technically, the cost of no bailout is easy to implement. Here, it is
straightforwardly just an another credit crunch related tax revenue decrease. In practice
however, the cost of bank failure may be impossible to quantify, and thus the bailout
condition may be considered more as a technical curiosity than an important outcome of
the research.
A conclusion from the one-country model is that the feedback loop can be avoided by
requiring banks to hold sufficient amount of equityE0 given the banking systems exposure
to sovereign debt α. This creates a limit to the supply of safe assets, i.e. feedback loop free
amount of sovereign debt, which is αS derived in Chapter 4.5. Brunnermeier et al. (2016)
notice that this debt exposure limit also effectively limits the amount of safe deposits that
banking system can generate. Hence, in practice this kind of equity requirement may turn
out to be too strict and limiting as a policy recommendation.
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7.2 Feedback loop in two-country model
The basic results of the reasons behind the feedback loop in the two-country model follow
the ones derived with one country. Again, the fundamental issue is the amount of equity
in banks’ balance sheets. If the equity is too low, the repricing of banks’ investments leads
to a feedback loop like in the one-country situation. The more important results from
the two-country model are related to interaction between the credit risk related to these
countries and their banks.
The big difference between one- and two-country models is that in the two-country version
banks have the possibility to diversify their investments by holding foreign bonds beside
the domestic ones. Thus, the home bias is reduced. The first result, that reallocating
portfolio from one type of bond to two different types reduces the direct exposure to single
bonds risk, is rather obvious. This can be seen by a simple comparison of portfolios, like
in equation 25, or from equity thresholds like 36 and 39, where reallocating a portfolio of
the same size means decreasing α and increasing β.
More formally, comparing a portfolio that contains only domestic bonds, with a portfolio
where part of the domestic bond holdings is reallocated to foreign bond holdings can
be demonstrated by changing the exposure parameter values e.g. in the first portfolio
α1 > 0 and β1 = 0 and in the second portfolio α2 < α1 and β2 = α1 − α2. If all other
parameters remain unchanged, the domestic bond price drop affects the price drop of the
whole portfolio in equation 33 less with α2 than with α1.
Now from the feedback loop point of view the situation changes from the one-country
model such that the equity threshold depends also on the foreign debt repricing. In
the simplest case, where foreign banks hold only their own government bonds and meet
the minimum equity requirement is shown in equation 36. This special case is very
straightforward and the equity threshold is simply a sum of domestic and foreign country’s
thresholds from the one-country model weighted with exposure parameters α and β. Now,
if banks’ aggregate equity is below this threshold, sunspot in either of two countries results
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in feedback loop. Somewhat more complicated looking equation 39 in the general case
where banks in both countries hold the bonds of both governments verifies this result.
A symmetric case by Brunnermeier et al. (2016), where banks hold similar portfolios,
means that the equity threshold for the banks of both countries follows equation 39. The
repricing effect of bonds is represented by τψL0 and τψL∗0, and in the symmetric case these
are similarly present in both countries. So, the repricing of the portfolio cannot happen in
one country without happening in the other. Thus, if equity is below the threshold, either
one of the two repricing effects results in the feedback loop. And, if banks’ equity is too
low in both countries the feedback loop occurs in both countries, even when the repricing
happens only to one of the bonds in the portfolio. This phenomenon Brunnermeier et al.
call the perfect contagion.
The feedback loop can be prevented like in one country situation by requiring banks to
hold enough equity. However, the equity threshold is now determined by the foreign
country specific parameters as well. Even in the simplest case 36, the threshold equation
includes the lending of the foreign banks L∗0 which affects the foreign credit crunch and
tax revenue. More complicated cases like in equation 39, when no additional assumptions
are made about the foreign banks’ initial equity, this foreign equity affects the equity
requirement of domestic banks. Also, the portfolio allocation decisions made by foreign
banks, represented by α∗ and β∗ are present in equation 39. This means that the minimum
equity required to prevent the feedback loop also depends on the portfolio of the foreign
banks. Thus, even in the relatively simple case with only two countries, defining the exact
equity lower limit turns out to be quite complicated, due to cross dependences between
countries.
In conclusion one can state that even though the investment diversification reduces the risk
of domestic sovereign debt to banks, it may lead to risk contagion between countries. The
logic how the credit risk is linked between countries in the two-country model can easily
be seen to apply to relationships between multiple countries. In the closely related group
of countries like Eurozone, the risk contagion is an especially possible outcome and can
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have severe economic consequences.
7.3 Risk transition between countries
The two-country model allows studying how cross dependencies between countries af-
fect the occurrence of the feedback loop, but also how the credit risk transfers between
countries. Especially interesting results is that the domestic sovereign risk can reflect to
domestic banks from their foreign bond holdings regardless of the domestic bond holdings.
The previous chapter presented how the feedback loop can be the result of foreign bond
holdings, which shows how the sovereign credit risk transfers from one country to another
via banking sector. In the models presented in this paper the repricing depends on the
exogenous sunspot probability, which does not contain any information about the state of
the economy. This means that a bond repricing in the two-country model may happen
also in a country with high fiscal surplus S. With high surplus repricing does not lead to
a feedback loop since government is always able to fully finance the bailout and repay its
debt. However, if the other country in the two-country model does not have high surplus,
and the banks’ equity in that country is below the equity threshold (see equations 36 and
39), repricing creates a feedback loop. So, the credit risk may transfer from one country to
another regardless of the economic situation of the country whose bond is repriced. The
same logic of course applies when the banking sector in one country is strong, i.e. has
enough equity to prevent the feedback loop.
When banks hold foreign bonds, there is a direct connection from foreign sovereign credit
risk to domestic banks’ balance sheets. A more interesting result from the two-country
model is that foreign bond holdings may also contain some part of domestic sovereign
credit risk. This is most easily seen when one studies situation where domestic banks do
not hold any domestic debt, but the foreign banks hold both bonds. Technically, this means
setting the domestic exposure parameter α = 0 in the model. Now the equity threshold
equation becomes 40. In this equation, domestic bond repricing τψL0 still exists. So,
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the equity threshold of domestic banks is affected by the domestic sovereign debt even
when the banks do not hold any domestic bonds. What happens here is that domestic
bond repricing deteriorates foreign banks’ balance sheets, which causes a credit crunch
and possibly even a government bailout. The credit crunch and bailout increase the risk of
foreign sovereign debt and result in a price drop in the foreign bonds. This foreign bond
price drop now deteriorates the domestic banks’ balance sheets that contain the foreign
bonds, and finally this deterioration leads to a credit crunch and even, in the worst case, to
a domestic government bailout. Hence, the domestic sovereign credit risk reflects through
the foreign debt to domestic banks, which means that banks are not safe from sovereign
debt risk even when they do not directly invest in that debt. It is also worth to point out
that the effect of domestic bond repricing τψL0 in 40 is increasing in β∗, meaning that the
larger the foreign banks’ exposure the bigger the effect of the risk transition. Again, the
foreign banks’ investment decisions affect the risk of the domestic banks.
Foreign debt may now contain part of the domestic sovereign risk. This can be called an
indirect effect of domestic sovereign credit risk. Existence of this indirect effect means that
banks cannot fully protect themselves from the sovereign credit risk with simple portfolio
reallocation. This can be formally seen from the general two-country equity threshold
equation 39, or in the extreme case from equation 40 as explained above. Decreasing α
and increasing β in 39 means allocating investment from domestic to foreign debt. The
decrease in α decreases the direct effect of the domestic debt, but increase in β increases
the indirect effect of the domestic debt. Thus, the reallocation does not decrease the
exposure to domestic debt risk in one to one ratio.
At this point, it is worth noticing that the effect of sovereign risk when it is only present
via foreign bond holdings is very limited. For example in equation 40 the domestic credit
crunch term is multiplied by both domestic and foreign parameters: foreign exposure β
and β∗, inverse of sunspot probability parameters (1−p) and (1− q) and with low surplus
parameters pi and ρ. Obviously, the effect shrinks to quite small. So at least, it is unlikely
that a feedback loop can occur between domestic government and foreign banks, with
foreign government being unaffected.
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Even a relatively simple two-country model reveals complex cross dependencies in the
financial sector. In Chapter 7.2 a symmetric case, when banks hold identical portfolios,
was presented. The symmetric case meant the situation where countries together create a
pooled asset containing bonds from all the countries and banks are required to hold only
that pooled asset (Brunnermeier et al. 2016). This asset can lead to perfect contagion.
Also without this pooled asset, the feedback loop can transfer from country to another
and risk of one country can transfer via the bonds of other countries even without direct
exposure. Moreover, banks in different countries affect each other through their portfolios
even though the model presented here does not contain any direct connection between
banks. Thus, a single government, not to mention a single bank cannot effectively control
all the risk, without extrememanners like capital mobility controls, hence the international
coordination and co-operation is required.
7.4 Banking union
The simple analysis of the banking union using the banking union model in Chapter 6
shows, that in this framework, transferring the bailout decision and cost from sovereign to
the banking union prevents the feedback loop effectively. This is because the bailout cost
does not burden the sovereign anymore, and the sovereign default risk disappears. The
banking union does not however remove all the costs from the sovereign, since the credit
crunch when banks are distressed still affects the sovereign.
In Eurozone, the ongoing creation of banking union aims to build a resolution fund to
cover bailout costs and that fund is financed by banks (European Comission, 2015a). Then
the member states would have no direct costs from banking union. In Chapter 6 the cost
of banking union membership was imposed on sovereign via credit crunch mechanism.
This way the sovereign is not directly involved in payments to the banking union, but faces
a cost when banking sector needs to reduce lending in order to pay the membership fees,
which affects economic activity and tax revenue.
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7.5 Cost of banking union to sovereign
The cost of banking union to sovereign cannot be greater than the cost of bailing out banks
by itself. This is the argument behind the model of banking union cost in Chapter 6. The
result is formalized in equation 45 and 46, which gives the maximum price of banking
union membership and maximum share of lending that this maximum price corresponds.
Even though this kind of price limit is relatively artificial, it allows rather reasonable
analyses of the issues related to the banking union.
First, the price is increasing in sovereign debt exposure, presented by parameters α and
β. This is natural since the bailout becomes more expensive when the exposure increases.
Thus, the countries with a banking sector that has large holdings of sovereign debt benefits
more from banking union bailouts and can pay a higher price for the membership.
Second, the price is also increasing in the probability of low fiscal surplus, both domestic
and foreign, presented by parameters pi and ρ. This is interesting, yet logical result
since the low surplus leads to the feedback loop equilibrium when sunspot occurs, and
increasing costs to government. Thus, the banking union brings more essential security
to governments in weak fiscal situation and they are willing to pay a higher price for the
membership.
Thirdly, the price is decreasing in banks’ aggregate equity E0, which is an evident result
since the higher equity reduces the bailout cost and thus benefits from the banking union.
This means that the countries that have banking sector with strong balance sheets are less
willing to pay for the banking union membership.
The price is decreasing in sunspot probabilities p and q. The reason again is that the bond
prices are calculated in relation to the sunspot probability and thus, the higher risk is more
priced into bond values resulting in smaller price drop and bailout cost. More interesting
interpretation is that if banks hold a large share of high risk bonds, the country benefits
less from banking union, because the bailout cost is smaller when repricing occurs. This
can also be interpreted such that, at country level banking union does not increase the risk
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of a moral hazard. This is a bit daring interpretation, because it is based on the perfect
information, i.e. all the agents are aware of the probabilities p and q, hence the bonds are
always priced correctly, and excessive risk taking does not really exist in this model.
The share of lending in equation 46 is decreasing in initial lending L0 and the share of tax
revenue from lending τ . This is interesting result, which can be interpreted such that if
country’s banking sector is large, i.e. largeL0, the smaller share results larger actual losses
to the economy. The same logic applies to tax revenue share τ , the higher tax revenue
share, the more costly the same banking union share is to the sovereign.
The lending decrease due to payments from banks to the banking union has also another
effect to sovereigns in case the bailout is needed. Even though the sovereigns still suffer
from the negative effect of a credit crunch when banks face solvency problems, the credit
crunch is at least some level smaller due to decreased lending caused by the banking union
payments. This can be seen in example from the formalization in equation 42 where the
lending is only 1− ω share of the original.
These results can also be seen from the banking union point of view. Since an increase
in the exposure to the sovereign debt increases the bailout costs, the banking union may
want to limit this exposure of the banks inside the union. Similarly, the banking union
may want to set some requirements for the banks’ equity to limit the bailout costs. For the
banking union, the high fiscal surplus of its member states is desirable, yet it can be rather
difficult for the banking union to conduct fiscal coordination in practice.
7.6 Banking union funds and bailout scenarios
Themaximum cost that sovereign is willing to pay for joining the banking union, explained
in previous chapter, also gives the limit to the amount of funds that the banking union can
obtain. Chapter 6.2 presents some different methods that banking union may use when
defining the size of the membership fee. The higher the fee, the more it represses the
member states economy. On the other hand, the banking union funds create a limit to
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bailout costs that the banking union is able to cover. So, there exists a trade-off between
the banking union’s bailout capacity and the disturbance to the economy of the member
state. The following presents different scenarios of bailouts, with varying banking union
membership fees.
The first situation is a kind of a benchmark case where the banking union fee is country
specific and as high as possible. This gives the absolute maximum amount of funds the
banking union can collect from the member states. In this borderline case, the banking
union always collects enough funds from a country that it can cover the possible bailout
cost of that country’s banks. The situation is formalized in equations 65 and 66, in which
the term (1 − ψ)τ is critical to analysis. This term is always less or equal to one, and
appears in the funds side of the equation 66, because the banking union does not face
the credit crunch, that is why the (1 − ψ) part, and the membership fee only affects the
sovereign with respect to tax revenue share, the coefficient τ . This can be generalized
such that the bailout is always cheaper or in the extreme case as expensive to the banking
union than to the sovereign, which further means that the banking union is always able to
collect enough funds to do bailout even in the worst-case scenario, where banks in both
countries need to be bailed out simultaneously.
The absolute maximum funds case shows that the banking union is very strong in this
model, and can collect as much funds as it needs. However, it may not be optimal to use
this maximum membership fee. If the critical term (1 − ψ)τ in 66 is strictly less than
one, the banking union actually collects excessive amount of funds, meaning that even
when the banking union bails out banks in both countries, it still has funds left. Since
the banking union does not have any other duties than bailouts in this model, it does not
need this surplus in anything. This leads directly to the second case, in which the banking
union fee is only a fixed fraction of the maximum fee. This is formalized in equations
65 – 69, in which the coefficient µ is the fraction of the maximum fee. In this case, it
is directly seen that when µ = (1 − ψ)τ , the funds collected from a country are equal
with the bailout costs of that country’s banks. Now, when the banking union bails out the
banks in both countries it uses all of its funds and no excess funds are collected. This is
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then the optimal membership fee, which is just high enough that the banking union always
succeeds in bailouts, but creates the minimum disturbance to the sovereigns’ economy.
The banking union may well select a membership fee that is lower than the optimal
presented above. This clearly means that the simultaneous bailout of the banks in both
countries in the model is not possible anymore. It may be argued that the simultaneous
bailout case is so rare, that the banking union may take the risk and choose the lower
membership fee to spare the member states from the credit crunch effects of the higher
fees. However, if the selected membership fee is low enough, e.g. small µ in equation 69,
the banking union may be unable to bailout banks in either of the countries. This can be
called a total failure of the banking union, and may in the worst case result in the feedback
loop in both of the countries. This is however quite unlikely outcome and would require a
noticeable shortage of funds in the banking union.
Unlike the total failure, the situation in which the banking union is able to bail out banks
in one country, but not in the other, a partial failure, is more likely scenario. A specific
case of the partial failure is formalized at the end of chapter 6.3. In this case the whole
funds of the banking union are used to cover bailout cost of banks in country one, and the
bailout in country two is left for the sovereign. Like shown in equation 80, with realistic
parameter values the country two is better off without the banking union membership in
this scenario. It is also worth noticing, that in this partial failure situation, the feedback
loop is even more likely in country two than before, because the sovereign is burdened by
the banking union membership fee on top of everything else. If the partial failure is less
dramatic and a part of the bailout cost in country two can also be covered by the banking
union, the membership may again be profitable to both countries.
The failure of banking union may result from the membership fee being too low, but also it
may result from divergences between the member states of the banking union. The bailout
cost in equation 49 is increasing in initial lending L0 and decreasing in initial equity E0
and the same applies to funds collected from a country in equation 51. Now, if country
one has a large banking sector, i.e. large L0, with poor solvency situation, i.e. low E0,
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and the country two has a small banking sector, with good solvency, the bailout cost of
banks in country one is high, but at the same time the funds collected from country two
are small. In the extreme case, this may even lead to a total failure of banking union, even
when the membership fee is not particularly low.
Chapter 6.2 presents also a formalization of the case in which the banking union fee
is set using the same share of lending ω for both of the countries. This solution would
probably support the equality principle, but considering the previous scenario of diverging
countries, the robustness of this type of membership fee setting is highly questionable. In
general, this type of common share would only take into account the different sizes of the
banking sectors between countries, while the country specific membership fee also takes
into account the country specific risk factors.
The model of banking union presented in this paper is a stylized and heavily simplified
formalization fromanything that is implemented in reality. Even so, itmanages to show that
the success of the banking union crucially depends on the design of it, which corresponds
the questions presented in other papers like Constâncio (2015) and Béranger and Scialom
(2015). If the banking union is too weak, having too little recourses, it may even leave
member states worse than without the union. On the other hand, too costly union will
depress the economies of member states, resulting yet another suboptimal outcome. Also,
the model in this paper suggest that it may be beneficial that the banking union sets some
requirements e.g. for banks’ equity and sovereign debt exposure and for fiscal surplus of
the member states. These suggestions are on a general level in line with the plans of the
European banking union, e.g. presented in European Comission (2015a) and European
Comission (2015b).
7.7 Comparing results with literature
The one-country model presented in this paper follows the original work of Brunnermeier
et al. (2016) and two-country model is extension to it. Brunnermeier et al. also present a
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two-country model where e.g. sunspot probabilities are independent between countries.
The formal two-country model presented in this paper manages to capture and formalize
the results of feedback loop contagion that Brunnermeier et al. present. The model
presented here diversifies the countries by assigning them independent probabilities for
sunspot and fiscal surplus, as well as banks’ portfolios are allowed to diverge from each
other. This enables studying different scenarios related to portfolio decision as well as
the effect of different types of foreign countries. The focus of Brunnermeier et al. (2016)
is slightly different, since they focus more on risk transmission via shared assets. Also,
the formalization of banking union in this paper is novel innovation and not present in
Brunnermeier et al. (2016).
The portfolio structure in the two-countrymodelwith foreign and domestic bonds is similar
with Farhi and Tirole (2016). However, here the foreign bonds contain risk similarly than
domestic bonds while Farhi and Tirole define the foreign bond as a safe asset. Thus, Farhi
and Tirole are not presenting any results about the risk transfer between countries, but
focus more on the domestic issues like the role of financial supervisor. The supervisor
in their model enforces a limit on the risky assets banks can hold, which corresponds the
maximum amount of safe assets available to banks solved with the one-country model in
Chapter 4.5. In general, this paper focuses more on the equity requirements for banks
which Farhi and Tirole do not cover, but in general the focus in their paper is much wider.
Many of the results in this paper regarding the role of banks’ equity and its relationship to
bailout cost, as well as the mechanism that creates the feedback loop has similarities with
many of the other studies like Cooper and Nikolov (2013) or Leonello (2014), but also
these studies like Farhi and Tirole (2016) do not present the relationship between domestic
banks and foreign credit risk or foreign banks’ investments, like the two-country model in
this paper.
Acharya et al. (2014) have foreign exposure in their empirical analysis, and interestingly
they find statistically significant correlation between foreign debt exposure and domestic
banks’ credit risk using CDS data, implying the risk transfer between countries via banking
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sector as suggested by the two-country model presented in this paper. Some similarities
with this paper about the role of foreign bond holdings can be found in Uhlig (2014), even
though he does not study feedback loop per se, but the role of sovereign and bank credit
risk in monetary union with a common central bank. Uhlig finds support for risk-shifting
hypothesis, i.e. that banks and sovereigns can shift part of the sovereign debt risk to the
common central bank.
Summing up, the academic literature does not contain many formal two-country or multi-
country models of the feedback loop. The role of foreign debt and risk transfer is covered
in some extent in Brunnermeier et al. (2016), and also Acharya et al. (2014) and Uhlig
(2014) make some contribution to the subject. The formal models of the banking union in
general, but also in the feedback loop context are even more rare. The two-country model
presented in this paper allows a detailed formalization and analysis of the risk transfer,
the role of banks’ investment decisions and the contagion of the feedback loop between
countries. The banking union model presents a stylized formalization of how the banking
union prevents the feedback loop, but also reveals the key issues that need to be taken into
account in its design.
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8 Conclusions
A formal mathematical one- and two-country models of the feedback loop between
sovereign and bank credit risks were presented. These models show that the feedback
loop can occur when the banks are exposed to the sovereign debt, their equity is low,
and a fiscal surplus of the sovereign is low. Under these circumstances, the repricing of
the sovereign debt leads to the feedback loop. The indication is that the feedback loop
can be avoided by requiring banks to hold enough equity. The models show that this
equity threshold depends on the level of exposure to sovereign debt, the probability of
low fiscal surplus and inversely on the repricing probability. In the two-country case the
equity threshold is additionally affected by the same factors of the foreign debt, but also
the equity of foreign banks. This means that already in the two-country scenario defining
the exact equity threshold is complicated.
Formal mathematical two- or multi-country models in the feedback loop context are rare
in the academic literature. On one hand, this is understandable considering the heavy
influence of home bias related to the feedback loop, and the ability of one-country models
to describe this situation. On the other, it is surprising because the crisis in Eurozone
indicates the risk contagion from country to another. The analysis in this thesis using the
two-country model are indeed interesting. The repricing of either one of the bonds that
banks hold can cause the feedback loop in one, or the other, or both countries. Especially
interesting is the result that banks may be exposed to the risk of their domestic sovereign
debt via foreign sovereign debt holdings. This means that for example bank regulations
which prevent the direct holdings of the sovereign debt are unable to fully prevent the
exposure to the risk of that debt.
As an extension to the two-country model, a formal model of banking union was created
in this thesis. Since the European banking union is a relatively recent step in the European
integration, only limited amount of academic literature covers the topic. The simple
analysis using the banking union model in this thesis not only shows that the banking
union breaks the link from banks to sovereign preventing the feedback loop, but also
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reveals that the design of the banking union is vital to its success. The banking union
design faces a trade-off between the banking union’s bailout capacity and the disturbance
to the economy of the member state. The analysis using the banking union model shows
also that it is beneficial to include some regulation in equity requirements and sovereign
debt exposures for the banks in the banking union.
In general, situations like the feedback loop, where two phenomena are simultaneously the
cause and the effect of each other, are interesting but less covered in economic literature,
something that probably changes in the future. Also, the role of sovereign debt and the
fragility of banking sector, and especially the questions related to banking unions remain
topical issues in economics.
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Mathematical appendix
One-country model
Derivation of the equation 7 based on the equation 6
∆1 = pi[τψL0 − α(−(1− p)∆1)− E0)]⇔
∆1 + piα(−(1− p)∆1) = pi[τψL0 − E0)]⇔
∆1 =
pi(τψL0−E0)
1−piα(1−p)
and continuing to equation 11
α(−(1− p)∆1) + E0 < 0⇔ plugging in ∆1
− α(1− p)pi(τψL0−E0)
1−piα(1−p) + E0 < 0⇔
− α(1− p)pi(τψL0−E0)
1−piα(1−p) < −E0 ⇔
− α(1− p)pi(τψL0 − E0) < −[1− piα(1− p)]E0 ⇔
− α(1− p)pi(τψL0 − E0) < −[1− piα(1− p)]E0 ⇔
− α(1− p)piτψL0 + α(1− p)piE0 < −[1− piα(1− p)]E0 ⇔
α(1− p)piτψL0 − α(1− p)piE0 > [1− piα(1− p)]E0 ⇔
α(1− p)piτψL0 > α(1− p)piE0 + [1− piα(1− p)]E0 ⇔
α(1− p)piτψL0 > [piα(1− p) + 1− piα(1− p)]E0 ⇔
α(1− p)piτψL0 > E0
Calculating equation 16
E0 > α
(1−p)pi
1−α(1−p)pi (τψL0 − E0)− τψL0 ⇔
(1− α(1− p)pi)E0 > α(1− p)pi(τψL0 − E0)− (1− α(1− p)pi)τψL0 ⇔
(1− α(1− p)pi)E0 > α(1− p)piτψL0 − α(1− p)piE0 − (1− α(1− p)pi)τψL0 ⇔
(1− α(1− p)pi)E0 + α(1− p)piE0 > α(1− p)piτψL0 − (1− α(1− p)pi)τψL0 ⇔
(1− α(1− p)pi + α(1− p)pi)E0 > (α(1− p)pi − 1 + α(1− p)pi)τψL0 ⇔
E0 > (2α(1− p)pi − 1)τψL0
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Two-country model
Simplifying equity threshold equation 35 to 36:
− α(1− p)pi[τψL0+β(1−q)∆∗1−E0]
1−αpi(1−p) − β(1− q)∆∗1 + E0 < 0
⇔
− α(1− p)pi[τψL0 + β(1− q)∆∗1 − E0]− (1− αpi(1− p))β(1− q)∆∗1
< −(1− αpi(1− p))E0
⇔
− α(1− p)piτψL0 − [α(1− p)piβ(1− q) + (1− αpi(1− p))β(1− q)]∆∗1
< [−α(1− p)pi − (1− αpi(1− p))]E0
⇔
α(1− p)piτψL0 + β(1− q)∆∗1 > E0 := E0
Deriving the result presented in equation 38 by combining the following results. Equity
threshold of the domestic country is 36:
α(1− p)piτψL0 + β(1− q)∆∗1 = E0
The foreign bond discount is
∆∗1 =
ρ[τψL∗0+β
∗(1−p)∆1−E∗0 ]
1−α∗ρ(1−q)
and now foreign banks can hold only their home country’s bonds meaning that β∗ = 0,
thus
∆∗1 =
ρ[τψL∗0−E∗0 ]
1−α∗ρ(1−q)
Foreign banks meet their equity threshold, meaning that
E0
∗ = α∗(1− q)ρτψL∗0 + β∗(1− p)∆1
and as defined above β∗ = 0 means that
E0
∗ = α∗(1− q)ρτψL∗0.
And plugging this E∗0 to foreign discount results to
∆∗1 =
ρ[τψL∗0−E∗0 ]
1−α∗ρ(1−q) ⇔
∆∗1 =
ρ[τψL∗0−α∗(1−q)ρτψL∗0]
1−α∗ρ(1−q) ⇔
∆∗1 =
ρ[(1−α∗(1−q)ρ)τψL∗0]
1−α∗ρ(1−q) ⇔
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∆∗1 = ρτψL
∗
0.
Now this ∆∗1 can be used in the original equity threshold to get the equation 38:
α(1− p)piτψL0 + β(1− q)∆∗1 = E0 ⇔
α(1− p)piτψL0 + β(1− q)ρτψL∗0 = E0
Derivation of general two-country equity threshold equation 39. First price discounts ∆1
and ∆∗1 are
∆1 =
pi[τψL0+β(1−q)∆∗1−E0]
1−αpi(1−p)
∆∗1 =
ρ[τψL∗0+β
∗(1−p)∆1−E∗0 ]
1−α∗ρ(1−q)
And equity threshold solved with respect to ∆∗1 is 36 (for derivation see equations 32 -
36):
α(1− p)piτψL0 + β(1− q)∆∗1 = E0
First, to shorten the notation in calculations denote A = 1 − αpi(1 − p) and B =
1− α∗ρ(1− q) and then solve ∆∗1 with respect to ∆1 results to:
∆∗1 =
ρ[τψL∗0+β
∗(1−p)∆1−E∗0 ]
1−α∗ρ(1−q) ⇔
∆∗1 =
ρ[τψL∗0+β
∗(1−p)∆1−E∗0 ]
B
⇔
B∆∗1 = ρ[τψL
∗
0 + β
∗(1− p)∆1 − E∗0 ]⇔
B∆∗1 = ρτψL
∗
0 − ρE∗0 + ρβ∗(1− p)pi[τψL0+β(1−q)∆
∗
1−E0]
1−αpi(1−p) ⇔
B∆∗1 = ρτψL
∗
0 − ρE∗0 + ρβ∗(1− p)pi[τψL0+β(1−q)∆
∗
1−E0]
A
⇔
AB∆∗1 = AρτψL
∗
0 − AρE∗0 + ρβ∗(1− p)pi[τψL0 + β(1− q)∆∗1 − E0]⇔
AB∆∗1 = AρτψL
∗
0 − AρE∗0 + ρβ∗(1− p)piτψL0 + ρβ∗(1− p)piβ(1− q)∆∗1 − ρβ∗(1−
p)piE0 ⇔
AB∆∗1 − ρβ∗(1− p)piβ(1− q)∆∗1 = AρτψL∗0 − AρE∗0 + ρβ∗(1− p)piτψL0 − ρβ∗(1−
p)piE0 ⇔
(AB − ρβ∗(1− p)piβ(1− q))∆∗1 = AρτψL∗0 − AρE∗0 + ρβ∗(1− p)pi(τψL0 − E0)⇔
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∆∗1 =
AρτψL∗0−AρE∗0+ρβ∗(1−p)pi(τψL0−E0)
(AB−ρβ∗(1−p)piβ(1−q))
Now to clarify calculation little bit further denote C = ρβ∗(1 − p)piβ(1 − q)), so the
denominator in ∆∗1 becomes AB − C.
Now plugging this ∆∗1 to equity threshold and denoting domestic equity variable as the
threshold E0, the general equity threshold equation without discount variables ∆1 and ∆∗1
can be solved:
E0 = α(1− p)piτψL0 + β(1− q)∆∗1 ⇔
E0 = α(1− p)piτψL0 + β(1− q)AρτψL
∗
0−AρE∗0+ρβ∗(1−p)pi(τψL0−E0)
(AB−C) ⇔
E0 = α(1− p)piτψL0 + Aβ(1−q)ρτψL
∗
0−Aβ(1−q)ρE∗0+β(1−q)ρβ∗(1−p)pi(τψL0−E0)
(AB−C) ⇔
E0 = α(1− p)piτψL0 + Aβ(1−q)ρτψL
∗
0−Aβ(1−q)ρE∗0+C(τψL0−E0)
(AB−C) ⇔
E0 = α(1− p)piτψL0 + Aβ(1−q)ρτψL
∗
0−Aβ(1−q)ρE∗0+CτψL0−CE0
(AB−C) ⇔
(AB−C)E0 = (AB−C)α(1−p)piτψL0+Aβ(1−q)ρτψL∗0−Aβ(1−q)ρE∗0 +CτψL0−
CE0 ⇔
(AB−C)E0 +CE0 = (AB−C)α(1−p)piτψL0 +Aβ(1− q)ρτψL∗0−Aβ(1− q)ρE∗0 +
CτψL0 ⇔
ABE0 = (AB −C)α(1− p)piτψL0 +Aβ(1− q)ρτψL∗0 −Aβ(1− q)ρE∗0 +CτψL0 ⇔
E0 =
(AB−C)α(1−p)pi
AB
τψL0 + (
1
AB
)(Aβ(1− q)ρτψL∗0 − Aβ(1− q)ρE∗0 + CτψL0)⇔
E0 =
(AB−C)α(1−p)pi
AB
τψL0 +(
1
AB
)(Aβ(1−q)ρτψL∗0−Aβ(1−q)ρE∗0 +ρβ∗(1−p)piβ(1−
q)τψL0)⇔
E0 =
(AB−C)α(1−p)pi
AB
τψL0 +(
1
AB
)(Aβ(1−q)ρτψL∗0−Aβ(1−q)ρE∗0 +ρβ∗(1−p)piβ(1−
q)τψL0)⇔
E0 =
(AB−C)α(1−p)pi
AB
τψL0 + (
β(1−q)ρ
AB
)(AτψL∗0 − AE∗0 + β∗(1− p)piτψL0)⇔
E0 =
(AB−C)α(1−p)pi
AB
τψL0 + (
β(1−q)ρ
AB
)(A(τψL∗0 − E∗0) + β∗(1− p)piτψL0)
Now by renaming AB := Θ and C := Λ, as well as changing A = 1 − αpi(1 − p) :=
1− A⇒ A = αpi(1− p) the form presented in equation 39 is finished:
E0 =
(Θ−Λ)A
Θ
τψL0 +
β(1−q)ρ
Θ
[(1− A)(τψL∗0 − E∗0) + β∗(1− p)piτψL0]
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Banking union
Calculating the final result 80 from 79
τψL∗0 − (P ∗1 − P ∗0 )− E∗0 = τψ(1− µω∗)L∗0 − (P ∗1 − P ∗0 )− E∗0 + µτω∗L∗0
⇔
τψL∗0 = τψ(1− µω∗)L∗0 + µτω∗L∗0
⇔
ψ = ψ − ψµω∗ + µω∗
⇔
0 = (1− ψ)µω∗.
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